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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade,

collective bargaining has

obtained a new lease on life.^
presidential

and gubernatorial

passage of state laws,

Through the signing of
executive orders and the

employees

in the public sector

have obtained and begun to exercise the right to
organize and bargain collectively over their terms and
conditions of employment.

These rights,

however,

did

not come without a struggle on the part of the public
servant,

nor did they come swiftly.

Since

1919,

for public school
to Moskow,

the drive for collective bargaining
teachers has been underway.

the struggle gained

impetus

According

in December,

1961, when the United Federation of Teachers,

a local

^See for instance:
Solomon Barkin, The Peeline
of the Labor Movement (Santa Barbara, California:
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961);
Paul Jacobs, 01 d Before _i_t_s Time:
Co i 1 ect i ve Ba rqa ? n ? nq
at 23 (Santa Barbara, California;
Center for the Study
of Uemocratic Institutions, 1963); Joel Seidman, "The
Sources for Future Growth and Decline in American Trade
Unions," Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annua 1 Meetinq,
Industrial Relations Researen Associat ?on (Madison,
Wisconsin:
1965), pp~ 69-103; and Joseph Shister, "The
Direction of Unionism 1 9^+7 - 1 967 ; Thrust or Drift?"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20, No. 4,
July, 1967, pp. 573-601.

2
affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, was
given support

in the form of personnel

and financial
i

resources by the labor movement.
of support was the
^AFL-CIO.

Union Department of the

Upon receipt of these contributions,

joined the
involved

Industrial

The major contributor

IUD.

Since then the

the AFT

IUD has been deeply

in organizing campaigns for collective

bargaining.

In addition,

the National

Education

Association has been spending huge sums of money toward
the same outcome.2
In 19^3 the nurses of California started their
long drive for collective bargaining rights when they
formed the California State Nurses Association.

It was

this association that showed what collective action
could do to improve the terms and conditions of employ¬
ment.3

It was this association that guided the American

Nurses Association to unanimously adopt the Economic
Security Program in 19^6.
program were:
professional

The objectives of this

"(1) to secure for nurses,
associations,

protection and

through their
improvement

2Michael H. Moskow, "Collective Bargaining for
Public School Teachers," in Critical Issues in Labor,
ed. by Max S. Wortman (New YoricThe Macmillan
Company, 1969), pp. 87-38.

York:

3Max S. Wortman, Critica1 Issues in Labor
The Macmillan Company, i 9o9), p.~T"0.

(New

3
of their economic security--reasonab1e and satisfying
conditions of employment;
public that professional
and

and

have passed

...

to assure the

nursing service of high quality

in sufficient quantity,

sick of the country."^

(2)

will

be available for the

Since that time several

states

laws enabling nurses to bargain collectively.

These two groups are by no means the only ones

in

the public sector that have spent time and money to
advance the cause of collective bargaining.
transit workers,
federal

fire fighters,

employees,

among others,

policemen,

Similarly,
as well

as

have struggled for the

right to bargain collectively over terms and conditions
of employment.
Every year the number of union members
public sector

is

come substantial

increasing.
changes

With this

in the

increase has

in work relationships and

working conditions--including the possibility of work
stoppages.

Although strikes by public employees are

prohibited by law in nearly every state,
have occurred with

increasing frequency

such stoppages
in recent years.

One possible solution to the problem of strikes
in the public sector is called compulsory arbitration.

4"The ANA Economic Security Program," A,merican
Journal of Nursinq, Vol. 47, No. 2, (February, 1947),
p. 70.

4
In effect,

compulsory arbitration relies upon nthe

persuasion of power rather than the power of persuasion".5
Accord'ng to Sanford Cohen,
Under compulsory arbitration, strikes are
prohibited by law, and disputes, if otherwise
unresolved, must be decided by a specified
arbitration process.
The idea of compulsory
arbitration has much surface appeal.
Actually,
it has dangers and problems.
The major argu¬
ment for compulsion is that it is a relatively
effective method of stopping strikes that for
one reason or another must not be allowed to
occur.
The arguments against it challenge
the workabi1ity.as well as the alleged value
of the process.b
The role of compulsory arbitration
barcainine has
until

long been controversial.^7

the late 1960's,

its use

However,'

the arguments for and against

in the public sector were purely theoretical.

In 1955 these theoretical
tic.

in collective

arguments began to be realis¬

For example, Wyoming was the first state to

legislate compulsory arbitration as the final

step to

5 K e i I W. Chamberlain and James W. Kuhn, Co 1 1 ect ? ve
Barcaininq (2nd ed., New York:
McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1965), p. 413.
^Sanford Cohen, Labor in the United States (3rd
ed., Ohio:
Cnar1es E. Merr iTT Pub 1ishinq Company,
1970), p. 267.
7See for example:
Herbert R. Northrup, Compu1 sory
Arbit rat ion and Government 1ntervent ?on in Labor
Disputes (Washinqton:
Labor Policy Association, Inc.,

T9°ZT.

5
impasses

in negotiations between public employers and

certain groups of public employees.

Although the
i

Wyoming statute applied only to firefighters,

it set

the stage for other states to enact compulsory
arbitration statutes.
Since 1965,
Rhode

Island

Hawaii

five other states have followed:

(1968),

(1970),

Pennsylvania

and Vermont

(1968),

Michigan

(1969),

(1970).

Since the State of Rhode

Island and Providence

Q

Plantations0 has made no provision for compiling any
information on the experience under the act,

it would

appear appropriate that a detailed analysis of one area
of employment covered by the

law,

departments, would greatly aid all
The parties would
arbitrators,

the

namely,

parties concerned.

include the Onion,
legislature

the police

in Rhode

the management,
Island,

and other

state legislatures contemplating similar laws.
study

is

intended to aid

in an appraisal

tiveness of compulsory arbitration boards

Such a

of the effec¬
in the public

sector.

Purpose of the Research Project
The purposes of this project are:

(1)

to describe

&The official title of the State is The State of
Rnode Island and Providence Plantations, hereafter re¬
ferred to as the State of Rhode Island or as Rnode Island.

6

how the tripartite compulsory arbitration boards
operate

in the State of Rhode

Island;

and

(2) to

consider some of the effects of these compulsory
arbitration ‘boards upon police

labor-management

re 1 ationships. in the State of Rhode

Island.

Objectives of the Study
This study will

determine whether or not the use

of collective bargaining
decreased

in the public sector has

in the State of Rhode

since both parties

In other words,

(labor and the corporate authority)

know that a third party will
putes,

Island.

they could feel,

resolve any and all

dis¬

as has been suggested by cities

and towns with compulsory arbitration,

that they do not

have to work as diligently as they might to arrive at a
mutually acceptable and determined solution.
• Another objective of this study

is to ascertain

any possible changes which should take place.
possible change might be

in the board

itself

One
(that

is,

the composition of the arbitration board or the proce¬
dures by which the members of the board are chosen).
second possible change might take place

A

in the procedures

which the board follows.
Depending on the effect that compulsory arbitration
has on the collective bargaining process

itself and on

7
participants'

satisfaction as a whole,

be made as to the

statements could

impact that compulsory arbitration

has had on the 1abor-management

relationship

in a

specific situation.

Significance of the Study
In a recent article by Hervey A.
Hutchison,9 the legal
municipal
individual

status of collective action by

law enforcement officers was studied by
states.

They found that:

employee organizations exist
the United States;
only local

units;

function as unions
Moreover,

(1) police

in large numbers across

(2) these organizations are policeand

(3) most of these organizations

regardless of their affiliation.

eleven states have no current

regarding the policeman's
bargain collectively,
implied

Juris and Kay B.

rights

legislation

right to join a union and

and twenty-four states have only

in this matter.

The authors

indicate

that a strong drive by a police "union" might cause
these thirty-five states to reconsider their positions.
In the past,

studies have been made

sectors of the economy.

in the private

The results have been used to

^Hervey A. Juris and Kay B. Hutchison, "The Legal
Status of Municipal Police Employee Organizations,1^
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23 (April,
1970), p. 3^3>W.

8

suggest "new"
will

ideas

into the public sector.

This study

make available to the private sector additional

information on public sector experience with compulsory
a rbit ration.
This study could also have significance for the
field of collective bargaining.

As previously reported,

eleven states have no legislation

regarding the police¬

man's right to join a union and bargain collectively,
and twenty-four states have
matter.

implied rights

This study could have an

in this

impact on these states

when they examine the experiences of other states.

This

does not mean that only police department collective
bargaining would be affected.
employees such as teachers,
transit workers,

Other public sector

nurses,

among others,

garbage collectors,

might be covered by

state laws enacted as a result of the experiences
encountered

in Rhode

Island and reported

in this study.

Students of collective bargaining would have
another study to compare the

impact that arbitration

can have on 1abor-management

relationships

sectors.

in both

9

CHAPTER

II

HISTORY AND GROWTH OF ARBITRATION

According to Flemming,
with labor arbitration
periods.1

the American experience

is clearly divided

into three

The first period extends from 1871 when the

anthracite workers of Pennsylvania arbitrated disputes
in the first

recorded arbitration proceeding^ to the

outset of World War
1941

II

in 1941;

the second period from

to the Lincoln Mills decision

third period

in

1957;^ and the

includes those years from 1957 to the

present.
There are marked differences between these periods,
.for the word "arbitration"

lacks a common meaning;

are also marked similarities,

and the arbitration

machinery of today has deep roots
themes

there

in the past.

Common

run throughout the three periods--for example,

outside pressures for arbitration

in the "emergency"

lR. W. Flemming, The Labor Arbitration Process
(Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, F56S), p. 1«
2"Results of Arbitration Cases Involving Wages
and Hours, 1865-1929", Monthly Labor Review, Volume 29,
Number 1, 1929, pp. 14, 16.
3lexti1e Workers Union v.
A1 abama, 353
. S, 448 (T537).

L1nco1n Mills of

10
situations and private efforts to develop a continuing
mechanism for settling day-to-day disputes were just as
prevalent

in

generalities,

1871

as they are

in

1971.

Beyond these

a true perspective comes only with a more

detailed examination of each of the periods.^

Three Periods of Arbitration

The F ? rst Period
The first

known case

in which an outside

arbitrator was employed took place

in 1871.

The

Committee of the Anthracite Board of Trade and the
Committee of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association
agreed to settle their disputes over "questions on
interference with the works,

and discharging men for

their connection with the Workingmen's Benevolent
Association" by referring the matter to Judge William
Elwell

of Bloornsburg,

Pennsy 1 van i a . 5

satisfactory to the parties
when the Ohio coal

The result was

involved.

But

operators and the coal

in 137^,
miner's union

submitted their dispute to another judge for a decision,
one company refused to accept the result and a strike
occurred.

Ultimately,

^Flemming,
Slbid.

the operators all

Labor Arbit rat ? on,

p.

1.

conformed to

the desires of the dissenting company rather than to
the arbitrator's award.^
As a general

proposition,

according to Flemming,

Arbitration prior to the turn of the
century, and even during the early 1900's,
was thought of as a substitute for the strike
in bringing about agreement over basic issues
like wages ... It was, in fact, almost a
truism of the period that strikes were dan¬
gerous and ineffective, did more harm than
good, and should be supplanted by peaceful
and intelligent methods for the settlement
of the industrial disputes.7
Interest

in arbitration was furthered

in the

1890's through the work of an organization called the
Congress of

Industrial

This organization

included

and government who were
trial

harmony.

Conciliation and Arbitration.
leaders from industry,

interested

in promoting

labor,

indus¬

In addition to these private efforts,

there were pressures on state legislatures to establish
such laws.

In these states,

primarily one of mediation

the board's function was

rather than arbitration as

we now know it.^
One of the critical

industries,

the railroads,

felt public pressure for the establishment of arbitra-

6 I bi d. ,

p.

2.

p.

3.

7 Ibid.
8lbid

tion machinery
century.

in the

The great

last quarter of the nineteenth

railway strikes of the 1870's and

1880's brought about the

introduction of bills

Congress for conciliation and arbitration.
federal

law,

the Arbitration Act of

No proceedings were

initiated under

in

The first

1888, was

ineffective.

it except that a

commission of three members was formed by the President
to report on the Pullman strike.^
The Arbitration Act was replaced by the Erdman
Act

in 1898.

This act also proved to be

ineffective

during the early years because the carriers were opposed
to
and

intervention.

By 1906,

the unions had grown stronger,

in the period from 1906 to 1913,

versies were settled,
not a single

sixty-one contro¬

six of them by arbitration,

and

important strike occurred affecting the

operation of the
In 1913,

trains.^

,

the Newlands Act, which created a Board

of Mediation and Conciliation with four full-time
members, was passed when a deadlock developed over the
composition of arbitration boards under the Erdman Act.

^Harry A. Mi 11 is and Royal E. Montgomery,
Organized Labor (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 197+"5T7Tp. 730-731.
101bicl. .

p.

731.

13
This Board worked successfully until

1916, when the

employees, who were dissatisfied with some previous
awards,

refused to submit their demands for an eight-

hour day to arbitration.

A nationwide strike was

averted only by passage of the Adamson Act two days
before the strike was to take place.^
vided for the basic eight-hour day,

This act pro¬

but payment for

overtime was to be at pro-rata rates,

rather than time

and one-half, as the employees had requested.

It also

provided for the appointment of a three member com¬
mission to study the operation and effects of the eighthour day, and to report

its findings to the President

and Congress.
During this time period,

Congress deliberated

over the passage of a compulsory arbitration law.
However,

changes did not come until

1926.

In that year,

Congress passed the Railway Labor Act, which established
a five man Board of Mediation similar to the one provided
under the Newlands Act.
disputes arising out of

A distinction was made between
interpretation and application

of the agreement and those having to do with changes in
rates of pay rules, or working conditions.

For a time

this act worked well, but the Depression of the 1930's

»1 Ibid., pp. 732-73'*.

14

brought about an accumulation of unsettled disputes and
grievances which caused further amendments
Since then,

the Railway Labor Act has

in 1934.

remained sub¬

stantially the same.^
While Congressional
at the national
made

in more

becoming

failed,

continuing progress was

limited private areas.

increasingly popular

relationships.
formed

level

efforts to achieve agreement

Arbitration was

in labor-management

The Arbitration Society of America was

in 1922 and the American Arbitration Association

in 1926.

The example of the use of arbitration

commercial
method,

in

affairs doubtlessly served to popularize the

particularly among lawyers and businessmen.^

Just prior to the 1929 economic depression,

union

membership was estimated at only 3.4 million.^

This

figure represented a decline of more than 1,500,000
members since V/orld War

I.

Furthermore,

this period

was the first time that the unions had failed to gain
in a time of prosperity.

121bid.,

pp.

738-740.

13Emil Edwin Witte, Historical Survey of Labor
Arbit ra tion (Phi1ade1phia:
University of rennsyI vania,
I952), p. 5.
^ I

,4Flemming,

Labor Arbit ration,

p.

12.

15
The passage of the V/agner Act
situation.

The question of national

in 1935 changed the
policy with regard

to union recognition about which there had always been
so much dispute was now settled.

However,

it was

1937

before the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of the We gner Act
Henceforth,

i n the- Jones and Laugh 1 i n case. ^

national

policy favored collective bargain-

i ng.
By 1939 union membership was estimated at over
eight million and by the end of V/orld V/ar

mi 11 ion.16

Hundreds of new contracts,

hastily worded, were drawn up.
was to raise questions of
and,

at sixteen

some of them

The immediate result

interpretation and application

upon cecoming deadlocked,

to arbitration.

II

the parties often turned

A’though there were no reliable esti-

~ates as to the use of arbitration prior to 19^0,

it

was estimated that fewer than eight to ten per cent of
the agreements in effect during the

1930's provided for

arb'trat'o^ of grievances as the final

IfhLftB /. Jones 5- Lauqhlin Steel

step

in the

Co.,

301

t.s. i (1W).
,C/Kilton Derber, "Growth and Expansion," in Labor
b'd tre v»ev/ Pea 1, ed. 1/ Milton Derber and Edwin Young
(Hadison:
university of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 5.

16

collective bargaining procedure.^

By 1941

the United

States Conciliation Service found such clauses
two per cent of the twelve hundred agreements

in sixtyin

its

files.'8

The Second Pe r ? od
When the nation entered World War
disputes could no longer be tolerated.

II,

industrial

Accordingly,

labor and management accepted President Roosevelt's
request for a no-strike,

no-lockout agreement and a

tripartite V/ar Labor Board was established.
the war,

Throughout

the War Labor Board vigorously supported the

utilization of existing voluntary arbitration proce¬
dures and promoted the
tion provisions
contain it.

inclusion of grievance arbitra¬

in those contracts which did not already

Under the V/age Stabilization Act of

free collective bargaining was

1942,

limited by the requirement

that the government approve wage and related matters.
This Act made
approval

it

impossible for the Board to give

to arbitration awards which affected wages,

but the Board nevertheless attempted to work out an

^Sumner H. Slichter, James J. Healy, and E.
Robert Livernash, The impact of Col 1ect ? ve Bargain ? ng
on Management (Wash i ngton, (J.tTT:
The Brookings
TiTst i tute, T"960), p. 739.
18p 1 ernmi ng,

Labor Arbitrat ion,

p.

13.

17
accomodation.
The

importance of the War Labor Board's attitude

toward grievance arbitration

is underlined

again at the state of union organization
passage of the Wagner Act
it was constitutional
like General
and General

Motors,

in

1935,

in 1937,
U.S.

looks

1941.

The

in

and the

ruling that

caused many corporations

Rubber,

Jones and Laughlin,

Electric to accept collective bargaining.

But others such as Ford,

Goodyear, Westinghouse,

Swift did not sign agreements until
decision of the U.S.
case,

if one

Supreme Court

1941.^9

The

in the H.J_.

He i nz

requiring collective agreements to be put

form of signed v/ritten contracts,
attitude

and

in the

caused a change

in

in many quarters.^

Just before the passage of the Wagner Act,

union

membership was approximately three million members.
1939 there we re eight

1945 the figure had
fourteen million.

to nine million members,

Ten years

later,

in

1955,

Labor and the New Pea 1,

20H.J. Heinz Co.
2‘Berber,

and by

increased to between thirteen and
the figure

was approximately sixteen to seventeen million.

l^Derber,

By

V.

Ml.KB,

311

U.S.

Labor a rid the New Pea 1 ,

p.

12.

514
p.

1

3.

(1941)

The
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number of collective bargaining contracts naturally
increased,

as did the number of contracts

arbitration clause.

including an

By 1944 the Bureau of Labor

Statistics

reported finding grievance arbitration

provisions

in seventy-three per cent of the agreements

in

its file.

cent

The figure

increased to eighty-three per

in 1949 and to ninety-four per cent

in

1960-1961.

The War Labor Board ceased to exist shortly after
the war ended

in

1945.

Had grievance arbitration been

proven unsatisfactory,

one might have expected that

it

would be dropped from the many contracts that had
adopted

its use during the war.

statistics

indicate,

In retrospect,
'three effects
concerned.

As the previous

this did not occur.
it

is clear that World War

insofar as voluntary arbitration

First,

II

had

is

it encouraged widespread adoption of

arbitration techniques.

Second,

the War Labor Board

served as a training ground for the men who subsequently
served as arbitrators.

Third,

it sharpened the distinc¬

tion between arbitration over rights and
According to Wortman,

22U.S.,

interests.

arbitration of rights

is grievance

Department of Labor, "U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics-Major Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Grievance Procedures", Bulletin No. 1H25- 1 (Washington,
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 1.
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arbitration,

in which the' arbitrator

interprets the

contracts which have already been negotiated,
arbitration of
which the

interests

impartial

and

is contract arbitration

in

umpire decides the unresolved

issues for the parties.^3
With this distinction came the opinion that con¬
tract,

or

interest arbitration, was of

than rights

arbitration.^

lesser

importance

Interest arbitration

is

concerned with the submission of a collective bargaining
issue which they have been unable to settle themselves
by an employer and a union to an

impartial

outsider.

Gregory has suggested that the compulsory arbitration
of

interests "should be called "compulsory collective

bargaining'

rather than arbitration."^5

According to Gregory,
issues

this submission of contract

is not arbitration at all

because the neutral

person hearing the case has no recognized standards to

23C. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr.,
Col 1ective Ba rqa1ninq (2nd ed.; Boston, Mass.:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 256-257.
2^See for instance:
Charles 0. Gregory, Labor
and the Law (2nd ed.; New York:
W.W. Norton 6Company, Inc., 1961), p. 477; and Irving Bernstein,
"Arbitration" in Industrial Conflict, eds. Arthur
Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur Ross (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954), p. 302.
^Gregory,

Labor and the Law,

p.

477.
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guide his deliberations and
When the

issue

is a wage

influence his

increase,

conclusions.^

the parties may
«

submit evidence of advances

in the cost of

They may show what wage rates prevail

living

in similar

dustries operating under simi 1 ar conditions,
the trend of wage

in¬

and what

increases has been among the particu¬

lar employer's competitors.
offered

index.

Also,

testimony may be

in connection with the employer's business

prospects and his ability to pay the union requests or
to pay any

increase at all.

Regardless of how formally and scientifically all
such evidence
it

is prepared and submitted at the hearing,

is not much help to the arbitrator.

It

is almost as

speculative as considering what might have ensued had
the union chosen to strike.

This so-called economic

evidence gives the arbitrator some facts to consider,
but

it furnishes only the roughest of guides.27
This belief of an absence of definite principles

or standards to govern the decision

is not entirely

justified,28 according to Elkouri.

There are a number

1bid . ,

p. 478.

27 Ibid.

D.C.:

2&Frank Elkouri, How Arbitration Works
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,

(Washington,
1952), p. 22.
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of standards which, while not as adequate as may be
desired,
of

are available and applied

interest disputes.

fol1ows:29
(1)

in the arbitration

Four of these standards are as

.
Prevailing Practice -

Industry, Area,
I ndust rv-Area

In giving effect to the prevailing practice,
an arbitrator relies upon precedent, adopting
for the parties that which has been adopted
by other parties through collective bargain¬
ing, or, as sometimes is the case, as a result
of arbitration awards.
An award based upon
application of this standard is not likely to
be too far from the expectations of the
parties, since most persons in the business
community have long accepted the idea that
there should be no basic inequalities among
comparable individuals or groups.
(2) Cost of Living
The cost-of-living standard is frequently
advanced in collective bargaining and arbi¬
tration during periods characterized by
pronounced changes in 1iving- costs.
in
applying the cost-of-living standard,
arbitrators rely heavily upon the index issued
monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the United States Department of Labor.
This
index reflects the cost of Living as of a
date about six weeks prior to its issuance.
By use of the index it is possible to measure
changes in retail costs of services and
commodities and the resulting effect upon the
purchasing power of the income of workers in

29For a complete listing see Elkouri,
Arb ? t rat ? on V/orks, pp. 99-129.

301bid

•

y

p.

95.

How
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the larger citi-es.^'
(3) Ability to Pay
Although it is a generally recognized princi¬
ple that large profits do not alone justify
demands for wages substantially higher than
those which are standard within an industry,
and that small profits do not justify the
payment of substandard wages, the ability-topay criterion is of great importance in the
determination of wage-rates and other contract
benefits.32
This importance lies in the fact
that, while an employer's ability to pay is
not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for
a change in wages, it is a significant element
properly to be taken into account in
determining the weight to be attached to
other criteria.33
(4)

Pub 1ic

1nterest

The question arises as to how far arbitrators
should go in considering the pub 1ic-interest
aspects of 'interest' disputes.
The public,
although not a direct party, has a vital
interest in the settlement of some disputes.
Fact-finding boards do give strong considera¬
tion to the public welfare in making recommen¬
dations.
It is in respect to public utility
disputes that the pub 1ic-interest criteria
are most often invoked.
Two considerations
are generally involved.
The first is that
services of public utilities, being constantly
consumed necessities of life, should be made
available to consumers at a fair price.
Since
wages paid by a utility will directly affect
the cost of its services to the public, the
amount of any wage increase granted might be

31 Ibid.,

p.

95.

32See for instance:
Third Avenue T ransit Corp.
et al., 1 LA 321 (1946); Genera1 Motors Corp., 1 LA
125 (1946); Internationa1 Harvester Co., 1 LA 512 (1946).

33E1kou ri,

How Arbit ration Works,

p.

111.
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affected by the arbitrator's conclusion as to
the probable effect of the increase upon the
price of the service involved.
The arbitrator
will keep in mind the needs of the consumer.
The second consideration, which has been
assuming increasing importance in recent
years, recognizes that the public has a para¬
mount interest in continuity of operations of
public utilities.
The public expects utilities
to provide uninterrupted service.
Some states
have enacted legislation to prevent strikes
by public utility employees.
Even before the
passage of such laws, however, most publicutility labor had come to recognize that its
responsibility to the public required
uninterrupted services.^1In addition,

Bernstein states that a high

of the utilization of
sector stems from a

interest arbitration

in the public

recognition by both management and

unions that contract arbitration,
limitations,

incidence

despite

inherent

is preferable to the stoppage of a vital

service.35
In the years between

\9k\ and 1957 it became clear

that arbitration was not only a device for settling
differences of opinion over the meaning and
tion of

contracts,

but was also

interpreta¬

a device for settling

differences of opinion over the content of contracts as
we 11.

Arbitration

in this

bargaining strategy,

3^Ibid.,

pp.

period was

to human

related

to

relations within the

126-127.

^SBernstcin, "Arbitration",

p.

303.
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plant,

and to organizational

imperatives within the

management and union structures.
with the

law,

period--after

and

It was

less concerned

is what distinguishes the next

1957--from the other two.

The Third Period
When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947,
included the following important Section 301.

it

Sub¬

section (a) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization represent¬
ing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties,^0
According to Wortman,

"this section obviously

applies to disputes which arise concerning arbitrability
or the obligation to arbitrate a particular dispute.
In 1937,

the Supreme Court decided in the Lincoln Mills^?

case that arbitration clauses in contracts were enforce¬
able in the federal court system and that

interpretation

of the contract was to be effected in the light of

36Scct.ion 301
Act of 1947.

(a),

Labor-Management Re 1 ations

3/Text ile Workers' Union v.

Alabama," T5T "U‘; STWTl 93777*

I Incoln Mills of
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federal

law.38

Since this decision was difficult
arbitrators were unclear as to what
this decision.
June of

I960,

workers cases,
Arbitrability

to

the courts meant by

Three years after Lincoln Mills,

popularly known as the

Trilogy.39

(the question of whether the contract

been troublesome,

to do so.

issue)

for despite the contractual

one party might

issue on the grounds that
it

in

the Supreme Court decided three Steel¬

required the parties to arbitrate a given

to arbitrate,

interpret,

had

commitment

refuse to submit a given

the contract did not

require

The Trilogy terminated this as the court

stated:
In the absence of any express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration,
we think only the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration
can prevail, particularly where, as here, the
exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration
clause quite broad.
Since any attempt by a
court to infer such a purpose necessarily
comprehends the merits, the court should view
with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to
become entangled in the construction of the

33Randle and Wortman,

Co 11ective Barqaininq,

p.

258

39Un ? ted Steel workers of Ame rica v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., ‘363 U.S. 57^ (i960); Un ited Steel workers of AmieTica v. Enterpr ? se Whee 1 &• Car CorporatTon,
36T" 0TS\ 593 (I960); United States S teeTwcTFke rs of
America v. American Manuf act u r i ng Co., 363 U . ST 5*64

TTWor:

~
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substantive provisions of a labor agreement,
even though the back door of interpreting the
arbitration clause, when the alternative is
to utilize the services of an arbitrator.^
In another of
strong support
remedies.

the Trilogy cases,

the court gave

to the power of arbitrators to create

After noting that

"the question of

inter¬

pretation of the collective bargaining agreement
question for the arbitrator" and

"the courts have no

business overruling him because their
the contract

is a

is different from his,"

interpretation of
^

the court

stated:

When an arbitrator is commissioned to
interpret and apply the collective bargaining
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgement
to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a
problem.
This is especially true when it comes
to formulating remedies.
There the need is for
flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situa¬
tions.
The draftsmen may never nave thought of
what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a
particular contingency.
’Nevertheless, an
arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the collective bargaining agree¬
ment; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice.
He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement.
When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to
this obligation, courts have no choice but to

^OlJn i ted $ tee 1 worke rs of Ame r i ca v. Warrior &
Gu 1 f NavTgat i on Co" 363 U. S. 57^ 0 960).
^Flemming,

Labor Arbit rat ?on,

p.

25.
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refuse enforcement of the award.^
The effect of the Trilogy was to enhance the
power and prestige of the arbitration process.
decisions have not changed the fact
arbitration
prudence.

are no

grievance

is basically a private system of juris¬
However,

contractual

that

Court

these decisions have stated that

agreements to arbitrate,

as well

longer mere gentlemen's agreements,

as awards,

but are

enforceable by order of the court.
One other use for arbitration has emerged
period between
1962,

President

1957 and the present.
Kennedy signed

bargaining with unions
the’order,

in an appropriate.unit,

exclusive

recognition.

Wheel

Under

or over whether tfie

maintained by the

Mediation and Conciliation Service,

^2United Steelworkers of America v.
& Car Corp. 363“U.S'. 593 (I960).
4327 Fed.

Reg.

551

the

is entitled to

represent a majority of the employees,

arbitrators drawn from the panel
Federal

service.^

Because disputes may arise as

is the appropriate unit,

union does

10988

represents the majority of

employees

to what

17,

recognition of and

in the federal

a union which

On January

Executive Order

which was designed to encourage

in the

(1962).

may be

Enterprise
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nominated by the Secretary of
questions.^
be found

Labor to resolve those

Further discussion of

later

this

subject will

in the following chapter.

Experiences With Arbitration

Se1ected Ame rican Expe r ? ences
The Railway Labor Act
the most

provides the framework for

comprehensive control

labor disputes on the American

of

which followed governmental
I.

operation of the

conditions," and to attempt

railroad

the duty of the
to "make and

rates of pay and working

to adjust all

differences

methods.^5

A five-man,
created,

it

reasonable effort

maintain agreements concerning

by peaceful

finding procedure.

intervention machinery

This Act made

parties to exert every

and the

result of dissatisfaction with

the then existing governmental

during World War

relations and

railroad scene,

most detailed experience with fact
This Act came about as a

labor

nonpartisan Board of Mediation was

which attempted mediation

not agree among themselves.

^Flemming,

if the'parties could

The Board was further

Labor Arbi t rat ion,

pp.

28-29.

^Herbert R. Northrup, Compu 1 sory Arb i t rat ?on and
Government Intervention 1n Labor Disputes (Washington,
D. C.:
Labor Policy Association, 1 nc. , I~966), p. 52.
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instructed to urge voluntary arbitration

if mediation

proved unsuccessful.

refused and

If arbitration was
i

the dispute was such as to

interrupt

the Board of Mediation was

instructed to notify the

President,

who could create special

investigate and publish findings.

interstate commerce,

emergency boards to
During the time

period between these various proceedings and the thirty
days after the

report of the emergency board,

neither

party was to alter the conditions out of which the
dispute arose except by mutual
however,

were under no

legal

agreement.

The parties,

obligation to accept

the

recommendations of the emergency board.
The period from 1926 to
way

1934,

during which

labor relations were conducted under the

legislation,
occurred.
half of

was

relatively peaceful.

rai1-

1926

Only two strikes

Although ten emergency boards were appointed,

these were set up during the

Act's operation.

The

labor peace during the

last year of the

increased threats to railway
last year of the Act have been

attributed by Kaltenborn to

inherent defects

in the

legislation.^

461bid.
wH. S. Kaltenborn, Government Adjustment of Labor
Disputes (Chicago:
Foundation Press, 1943), p7 52.

30

Whatever

its merits,

fective by the

the

1926 Act was found de¬

railway unions on several

desired national

counts.

They

adjustment boards with effective

machinery for breaking deadlocks and for enforcing
awards;

specific penalties,

tive process,

in addition to the

to prevent•carrier1s

choice of employee's

influence over the

representatives;

formal

machinery

by which bargaining agents could be selected;
drastic changes

in personnel

and

of the Board of Mediation,

which had fallen from their favor.
were achieved by the

injunc¬

All

these objectives

1934 amendments to the Railway

Labor Act.**®
The amended Railway Labor Act maintains
structure of the
arbitration,

1926

legislation

the basic

insofar as mediation,

and the appointment of emergency boards

are concerned.

The main difference

in this

respect

is

that the five-man Board of Mediation was abolished and
replaced by a three-man National

Mediation Board.

1934 amendments established the National
Adjustment

Board,

Railroad

which had jurisdiction over grievances

and disputes arising out of the
ments.

The

interpretation of agree¬

The amendments also provided elaborate safe¬

guards for the free choice of employee

^Northrup,

representatives

Compulsory Arbitration,

p.

53.
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by setting forth a

list of unfair

to those contained

in the Wagner Act.

As a comprehensive code of
railroads,

labor practices

labor

the Railway Labor Act:

similar

legislation for

(1) established

definite provisions for the conduct of negotiations and
provided for the postponement of strikes or
until

a variety of government

have occurred;

(2)

intervention techniques

provided for compulsory arbitration

of grievance disputes before a national,
supported bipartisan board;
of

selecting bargaining

employer unfair

lockouts

(3)

publicly

provided for a method

representatives and proscribed

labor practices;

and

(4)

applied the

principles and practices of the Act which were developed
in the

railroad

industry to a new

industry--air trans¬

portation. ^9
With

respect to compulsory arbitration,

government outlawed
1967,

and

1970.

railroad strikes

In so doing,

lished that may be followed

the

in the years

1963,

a precedent was estab¬

in the future.

According

to Taylor and Witney:
Whether or not the carriers and the
organizations like it or not, whether or not
the true public interest is promoted by this
policy, the cold and inexorable fact is that
from this time forward the federal government

49 Ibid

•

>

pp.

5^-55.
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will not permit national railway strikes.
The
carriers and organizations must understand this
and base their future actions on the basis of
this incontrovertible proposition.
No longer
will the threat of a strike or lockout serve to
stimulate and induce the parties to reach a
settlement in genuine and good-faith collective
bargaining.
The government has removed the
threat from the picture, and future policies
and behavior of the carriers and the union
organization will take this into account.50
In effect,
industry

what has happened

tolerate a national

there was no

understand that

railroad work

realistic collective bargaining.

The parties do meet and discuss
there will

issues but once they

be no strike or

they make no serious attempt to
This

railroad

is that once the parties understood that the

government would not
stoppage,

in the

raises two basic questions:

lockout,

reach a settlement.
(1) Why should the

parties bargain

realistically when they are fully aware

that failure to

reach a settlement would not

economic sanctions? and

result

in

(2) Why should they make any

genuine and serious effort

to

resolve their differences

when they are aware that making concessions would serve
to weaken their position

in the eventual

arbitration?51

^^Benjarnin J. Taylor and Fred Witney, Labor
Relations Law (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971),
pp. 455-6.
^Taylor and Witney,

Labor Re 1 at ions Law,

p.

456.
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Another experience with compulsory arbitration
occurred when the

legislature

in Kansas passed the
i

Industrial
passed

in

Court Act

in January,

response to a coal

limited the coai
schools and

strike

in

This Act was
1919,

which

supply just as winter began.

industrial

lack of fuel.

1920.

Many

plants were forced to close for

The object of the Act was to protect the

public against organized oppression,

to safeguard

liberty,

to settle differences on their merits,

maintain

industrial

peace.52

only to specified essential
Mi 11 is and Montgomery,

these

This

and to

legislation applied

industries.

According to

industries were:^

(1)

the manufacture or preparation of food pro¬
duct s;

(2)

the manufacture of clothing;
*

(3)

the mining or production of any substance or
material in common use as fuel;

(A)

the transportation of any and all
above; and

(5) all

public utilities and all

Since arbitration with
parties participating was
the

legislature,

the

common carriers.

representatives of both

regarded as undesirable by

law provided for the settling of

^Millis and Montgomery,

53|bid.

of the

Organized Labor,

p.

823.
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disputes by a Court of
of three neutral

Industrial

Relations consisting

parties.

A considerable number of cases were decided
satisfactorily by the Court,
strikes prevented.
tions

and an unknown number of

There were also a number of

in which the Court- proved to be

situa¬

ineffective.

An

example was the spontaneous walkout of a majority of
miners

in a district

to how to proceed.

that

left the Court at a

loss as

It could not take any action against

any union since the walkout was a voluntary

individual

matter.^4
Even though many persons and organizations were
receptive to compulsory arbitration,

the Supreme Court

of the United States declared this Act
on the grounds that

it

employees to continue
own making.
and
of

This

sought

to compel

unconstitutional
owner and

in business on terms not of their

infringed upon the

liberty of contract

rights of property

guaranteed by. the due process

law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.^5

The Fore 1qn Expe r ? ence--Aust ra1ia
In addition to the compulsory arbitration

y

5^Ibid.,

p.

826.

55|bid.,

p.

827.
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situation as
above,

it

it exists

in the experiences mentioned

should be noted that Australia has had

experience with this type of dispute settling techniques.
Since the passage of the Commonwealth Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration Act of

1904,

Australian

labor unions have been under a form of public control
arid

regulation.

given a virtual

Under this Act,
monopoly

in

a

registered union was

its trade or

industry to

represent workers during collective bargaining pro¬
cesses.

The chief objective of the Act was to .

encourage the organization of

representative bodies of

employers and employees and their

registration under

the Act.Since the jurisdiction of the Court has
been

interpreted very

national

liberally,

practically all

labor unions have found

it advantageous

register under

it.^7

Under the Commonwealth machinery,
lockout
still

is

to

illegal

once a union

is

the strike or

registered.

Strikes

rema i n a frequent occurrence arid have been

5°D. W. Oxnam, "Industrial Arbitration in
Australia:
Its Effects on Wages and Unions,"
Industrial
and Labor Re 1 at ions Rev 1 ew, Vol . 9 (July, 1956)^ p~! 615.
57Northrup,

Compulsory Arbitration,

p.

37.
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increasing at a rapid rate.

In

1959,

Sharp wrote:

The number of disputes per year since 1950
has been mainly in the excess of ‘the number in
years prior to that date, and has been consider¬
ably higher than the pre-war level, even allowing
for population growth and increase in industrial
establishments.
Furthermore, whatever decline
there has been in the number of disputes has
occurred almost entirely in the coal mining
industry.
If that industry, which has been under
particular economic stress in recent years, is
excluded, it becomes clear, beyond doubt, that
the number of disputes has
been increasing quite
sha rp1y.
In

1963,

groupings

the number of strikes

in most major

increased over the previous year and again

in

1964 the statistics show that there was a considerable
increase

in the

level

of

industrial

disputes over the

previous year.59
There are two possible explanations for the rapid
rate of

increase

in these disputes.

First,

in past

years a number of key unions were dominated by left-wing
or Communist elements and either refused to register,
or paid no heed to registration obligations.
unions have been concentrated

in mining and

These
longshore,

5^'lan Sharp, "Some Features of the Australian
Industrial Relations Scene," The Jou rna1 of Indust rial
Relations, Vol. 1 (April, 1959), p. 5.
59j. R. Kerr, "Industrial Relations 1963-1964,"
The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6 (November,

T554TTppT“ l TJ-T74T
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which,
a

in Australia as

record of frequent
A second

Australia
union

industrial

reason for the poor strike

is the

lack of effective

heavily dependent

support,

local

disputes will
there

is

into

local

work,

in

or national

upon government and politi¬
leaders siphoned

and with the experience that

come before a government board anyway,

little

incentive to attract

union activity and even

settle at the

record

With a union

with the most able union

into political

have had

stoppages.^0

leadership and organization.

movement
cal

in many other countries,

local

level.

promising persons

less

incentive to

The failure of the

Australian system to distinguish between disputes over
new agreements and disputes over grievances or contract
interpretation aggravates this problem because

it means

that any significant dispute of either kind

likely

to be decided by a government

tribunal

is

rather than at a

bargaining session.^
In
union

recent

years,

the separation of the national

leadership from the

rank and file has become

60Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman,
Patterns of Industria 1 Conf1 1ct (New York:
Sr Sons, Inc.l 19& 0), pp~ 147-148.
^Northrup,

Compu 1 sory Arb ? t rat ? on,

p.

Chang ? nq
John Wlley

40.
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almost formalized by the' creation of
councils to handle local

union work.

local

shop

These have been

condemned as Communist-inspired by top union
but apparently are not always so.

leadership,

The councils have

constituted a challenge to the union "establishment" by
taking strike action without union approval.82
The

interest of the rank and file

in shop councils

indicates the remoteness of dispute settlement
Australia from the union member.
is still

something

in

While strike action

in which the rank and file of unions

generally have a direct part,

the settlement of.griev¬

ances and the termination of disputes through the
public machinery of conciliation and arbitration has
become dependent not on rank and file judgement and
action,
field,

but on the services of specialists
be they union officials,

industrial

in that
advocates,

or barristers.
Compulsory arbitration has had a profound
ence on trade union development
arbitration
organize,

in Australia.

influ¬
Compulsory

induces the unorganized employees to

and the employers to negotiate before an

arbitration tribunal

82kerr,
83Sharp,

is established.

"Industrial

Australia has

Relations," pp.

173-175.

Features of Australian Scene,

p.

3.
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become one of the most highly unionized countries
the western world,
level

but union organization at the local

has been neglected

in the process.

Today,

than sixty per cent of the employed labor force
trade unions,

in

more
is

in

largely because of the artificial

creation of the arbitration system.
enhanced union power,

but has made

The system has
it utterly dependent

CL

on government.
There

H

is some indication that the trade unions

are growing restless under the regulations
them.

For example,

Council

imposed upon

the president of the Australian

of Trade Unions advised visiting students from

Asian countries,

"Don't allow your workers'

tions to become shackled as we have become
through too much

organiza¬
in Australia,

legalizing of the system."^5

As to the effect on collective bargaining,

all

evidence points to the tendency to paralyze the
propensity to settle and to bring to the arbitration
courts a myriad of disputes which under a freer bar¬
gaining system would be settled by the parties

6^Northrup,

Compulsory Arbitration,

p. 43.

65L. S. Merrifield, "Regulations of Union
E1ections in Austra1ia," Indust rial and Labor Re 1 ations
Review, Vol. 10 (January, 1937), pT 2o3.

4o
themselves.

In recent years,

the red tape delays and

tangled legalistic approach have

induced a few indus-

tries and unions to settle their own disputes.
According to Northrup,
There can be no doubt that the Australian
arbitration system has not succeeded in
eliminating strikes or lockouts.
It may have
shortened strikes, but it certainly has increased
their numbers.
Anyone who believes that the
existence of a compulsory arbitration system
will either curb unionism or wi11 eliminate or
reduce the number of strikes would be well
advised to make a
realistic study of the
Australian experience.°7
According to V/alker, the Australian compulsory
arbitration has certain built-in rigidities:
On a rising market arbitration prevents
the workers from obtaining full advantage of
their economic pov/er due to the keen demand
for labor.
On a falling market, arbitration
obstructs employers from obtaining the full
advantages of their economic power due to the
scarcity of jobs and the weakness of trade
unions through abnormal unemployment.^
There seems to be general
rigidities exist

agreement that these

in Australia and that another effect

has been to narrow skill differentials so that the

66(\j0rthrup,
6?lbid.,

Compu 1 sory Arb i t rat ion,

p. 43.

p. 44.

F. V/alker,
Aust ra1ia (Cambridge,
Press, 1956), p. 4.

Industrial Relations in
Mass.:
Rarvard University
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unskilled are over-priced relative to the skilled.
Such a regidity reduces the
the occupational
Finally,

incentive to progress up

ladder.

there has been some criticism of the

role of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court's wage
determination policy and national

economic policy.

Because of the nature of the Court's powers
invariably

involved

the national

in general

economy.

it

is

reviews of the state of

Yet the Court appears to conduct

its operations outside the framework of general

economic

policy and without channels of communication between

it

and policy-making agencies.

Summa ry
Labor arbitration
into three periods.

in the United States

The first period-began

with the first known case
was employed.

In the

is divided
in

1871

in which an outside umpire

1890's,

arbitration advanced

through the work of an organization called the Congress
of

Industrial

Conciliation and Arbitration.

The

primary function of this board was one of mediation
rather than arbitration as we know it today.
tion advanced further

in the 1920's when the American

Arbitration Association was formed.

^^Northrup,

Arbitra¬

This period ended

Compulsory Arbitration,

p.

44.
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when the United States entered World War
The years between
period,

made

1941

and

1957,

II.

the second

it clear that grievance arbitration was

not only a device for settling differences of opinion
over the meaning and

interpretation of contracts,

was also related to bargaining strategy,
relations within the plant,

but

to human

and to organizationa1

imperatives 'within the management and union structures.
The start of the third period was
1957 when the Supreme Court decided
case that arbitration clauses
able

in the federal

Trilogy.

in the L. i ncol n Mills

in contracts were enforce¬

court system.

in this period were those

in the year

included

Other landmark cases
in the Steelworkers

In addition to these court decisions,

President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10938, which
was designed to encourage recognition of and bargaining
with unions

in the federal

service.

Experiences with compulsory arbitration discussed
in this chapter

include both American and foreign.

selected American experiences are the railroad
and the

Industrial

Court Act passed

in Kansas.

The

industry
The

Australian experience with compulsory arbitration began
with the passage of the Commonwealth Court of Concilia¬
tion and Arbitration Act of

1904.

Since that date,

Australian labor unions have been under a form of public
control

and regulation.

^3

CHAPTER

III

i

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
UNIONIZATION, AND ARBITRATION

According to Taylor and Witney,

the

issue of

public employee collective bargaining reached
unprecedented proportions

in the decade of the sixties.

The changing composition of the labor force
United States has brought with
government employment.

it a rapid

rise'in

In 1930 about six per cent of

the civilian labor force was engaged
ment.

in the

in public employ¬

By 1968 government employees constituted nearly

seventeen per cent of the non-agricu1tura1 work forced
At the close of that year,

federal,

governments employed a total

of

state,

and local

12,202,000 workers.^

Government employment has more than doubled since
when

19^7,

it totaled 5,^7^-, 000.3
In addition,

Taylor and Witney reported that the

greatest gains have been at the state and local

1 Benjamin J. Taylor and Fred Witney,
Relations Law (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall,

Labor
Inc.,

T97ITTp. 503.
2Month!y Labor Review,
(May 191790, p. 99.

31bid.

Vol. XCI 1,

No.

5

level--
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not at the federal

level,

as

is often mistakenly believed.

About one-third of state and local
rently

associated with education.

year period,' federal

employment

cent while state and local
three hundred per cent.

Over the twenty-one-

rose by about fifty per

employment

State and

1968 accounted for 9,465,000 of the
ment employees.

employees are cur¬

increased nearly

local

employment

12,202,000 govern¬

If the current trend continued,

sixteen million persons will

in

be employed by all

nearly
levels

of government by 1975.^

Collective Bargaining

in the Public Sector

In tracing the history of collective bargaining
in the public sector,
employees
yards. Cj

unionization of the federal

reportedly existed as early as

1800

in naval

In addition, wage rate negot rat i on. has occurred

among various

levels of TVA employees

ranging from those

classified as production workers through the professional
ranks.

Negotiations have been carried on despite the

general

understanding that wages are set by law.

^Taylor and Witney,

Labor Re 1 ations Law,

p.

503.

5H. Roberts, A Manua1 For Employee-Management
Coope rating in the Fede ra1 Service (Hawaii:
Indust rial
Relations Center, University of Hawaii, 1964), p. 4.
^Taylor and Witney,

Labor Re 1 at ions Law,

p.

505.
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The first

legislation with

respect to federal

policy toward employee organizations was the Pendleton
Act
in

(commonly known as the Civil
1883.

Under this act,

Service Act),

passed

only Congress has the

authority to regulate wages,

hours and other terms and

conditions of employment.
In
federal

1902 President Theodore Roosevelt banned
employees from seeking beneficial

directly or

legislation

indirectly through their associations.

Benefits were to be obtained through the departments
which they were employed.
grounds for dismissal.7

in

A violation- of the order was
In 1906 President Roosevelt

broadened this order and stated that:
All officers and employees of the United
States of every description, serving in or under
any of the Executive Departments or independent
Government establishments, and whether so serving
in or out of 'Washington, are hereby forbidden,
either directly or indirectly, individually or
through associations, to solicit an increase of
pay or to influence or attempt to influence in
their own interest any other legislation what¬
ever, either before Congress or its Committees,
or in any way save through the heads of the
Departments or independent Government establish¬
ments, in or under which they serve, on penalty
of dismissal from the Government service.0

York:

7Ster!ing Spero, Government as Empioyer
Remsen Press, 1941377 p. 122.

(New

&Kurt L. Hans 1 owe, "The Emerging Law of Labor
Relations in Public Employment," ILR Paperback No. 4
(Ithaca, N.Y.:
New York State School of Indust rial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1967), p. 35.
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In

1912 Congress

rejected this approach by passing

the Lloyd-La Follette Act.^

This statute became the
«

basis for the principle that federal
general

employees

in

had the right to join any organization that

did not assert the right to strike against the govern¬
ment.^

If a literal

interpretation

is made,

the Act

restricted protection of union membership to postal
employees.

Despite that fact,

other empfoyees gained

the right to organize on the basis of
However,

the right to organize

is of

its

language.

limited value

if

procedures are not provided to guarantee an effective
collective bargaining process.
In
written

1920 the government negotiated
labor

its first

This contract covered most

agreement.^

of the construction workers on' the Alaskan railroad and
proved to be an added
gaining.

impetus to federal

employee bar¬

This progress was soon slowed by the Boston

police strike at the local

level which will

be discussed

later.

95 U.S.C. 642

(1912).

^Charles B. Craver, “Bargaining in the Federal
Sector," Labor Law Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 9 (September,
1968), p. 570.
‘1 Taylor and V/itney,
•2Craver,

“Bargaining

Labor Relations Law,
in the Federal

p.

Sector".

506.
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In the 1940's,
ployees
a

another thrust was made by em¬

in the public sector for Congress to establish

law that would not only give the unions the right to

represent federal

employees,

but would also set up

machinery to guarantee an effective collective bar¬
gaining process.

This thrust culminated with the

introduction of the Rhodes-Johnston Bill

of

1949 which

was a measure to protect the right of unions to represent
federal

^3

employees.

11 failed to pass

in that year

and was debated over the next fourteen years until
President Kennedy signed Executive Order No.
law in January,
Until

10938

into

1962.

1982 and the signing of E.0o

10988 the

doctrine of sovereignty had been used by governmental
bodies as a basis of denying the collective bargaining
process to public employees.
as the supreme,
which any

absolute,

and uncontrollable power by

independent state

United States,

Sovereignty may be defined

is governed.^

ultimate power reposes

In the

in the people but

is exercised for them by their duly elected representa¬
tives.

These representatives exercise sovereign power

1 3W i Ison R. Hart, Col 1ective Ba rgaining ? n the
Federa1 Civil Service (New York:
Harper & Row,
1 9 3 1 ), p“ 168 .
l4jaylor and Witney,

Labor Relations Law,

p.

504.

within the limits placed bn them by constitutions and
statutes.
viewed as

Unionization of government workers was
interference with sovereign authority because

it could lead to joint determination of wages,
and terms and conditions of employment.

hours,

Union attempts

to take away or snare a sovereign power was therefore
uni awful.15
This attitude seemed to change when President
Kennedy was elected
been

involved

in I960.

As a senator,

in many unsuccessful

Rhodes-Johnston Bill.

In

1961

Kennedy had

attempts to pass the

he appointed a six-

member task force to study the problem of employeemanagement
group,

relations

in the federal

headed by Arthur Goldberg,

November 30,

1961,

and

reported

service.^3

submitted

The

its findings

in part:

At the present time, the Federal
.Government has no Presidential policy on
employee-management relations, or at least
no policy beyond the barest acknowledgements
that such relations ought to exist.
Lacking
guidance, the various agencies of the
government have proceeded on widely varying
courses.
Some have established extensive
relations with employee organizations; most
have done little; a number have done nothing.
The Task Force is firmly of the opinion that
in large areas of the Government we are yet

15 I bid.
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to take advantage of this means of enlisting
the creative energies of Government workers
in the formulation and implementation of
policies that shape the conditions of their
work.17
The Task Force felt that
government to fail

to extend to

it was

its own employees the

same privileges enjoyed by workers
prise as a result of federal

improper for the

in private enter¬

action.

It noted that

responsible unions would strengthen and
fede ra1

service.

1R

°

In January,
the report by

improve the

1962,

President Kennedy responded to

issuing E.O.

No.

10988 which established

the basic framework within which collective bargaining
was to take place
of government.

in agencies under the executive branch

For the first time federal

employees

had the protected right to join unions and engage
collective bargaining with the federal
whom they worked.
stances must
unions

in

agencies for

These agencies under proper circum¬

recognize and bargain collectively with

representing government employees.

The federal

17Report of the President's Task Force on EmployeeManagement Relations in the Federal Service, _A
Pol icy
For Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal
Serv i"ce [WalTh i nqtorf^ D*7C.:
Government Printing Office,
1WV p. i i i .

pp.

l^Hanslowe,
39-40.

Erne rging Law of Labor Re la tions,
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government has attempted to provide organizationa1
bargaining rights for

its employees

and

in essentially the

same way as these rights are established for employees
in the private

sector.^

After E.O.
years,
1969,

changes

10938 had been

in effect for eight

in the order we re necessary.

In October,

President Nixon issued Executive Order No.

11491

which substantially changed President Kennedy's order.
Under the present order,

exclusive recognition

provided for unions representing federal

is now

employees.

To

gain exclusive recognition a union must be selected by
a majority of the employees
a secret ballot election.

in a bargaining unit through
Under E.O.

10938,

unions were

able to secure exclusive recognition by using signed
union membership authorization cards.
In another change,
Civil

under the original

Service Commission and the various federal

were given the power to oversee and
and procedures contained

in E.O.

creates a three-member Federal
to administer the program,
and

order the
agencies

implement the policies

10988.

The new order

Labor Relations Council

decide major policy matters,

issue rules and regulations.

Also,

the new order

enables the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-

19Taylor and Witney,

Labor Relations Law,

p.

508.
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Management Relations to have the authority to resolve
disputes over the composition of bargaining units and
representation rights,

to order and supervise elections,

and to disqualify unions from recognition because of
corrupt or undemocratic influences.

Formerly these

matters were resolved by the particular federal
and their final

judgement was not subject to appeal.^

Without a doubt,
to a prominent place

unions

in general

have advanced

in employee-employer relations

the public sector since the
context,

agency

1800's.

in

In this general

one specific segment of the public sector will

be examined,

namely,

police departments.

Police Labor Organization
In the early
the country joined
St.

Paul,

cities

1900's,

policemen

labor unions.

Boston,

Los Angeles,

and Jersey City were among the thirty-seven

in which policemen organized.

to keep pace with the rising cost of
reason given for the change
toward

in many parts of

labor organizations.

Failure o\
living

wages

is the main

in the policemen's attitude
This movement

ization was not without difficulty.

into union¬

In Washington, when

the policemen were ordered to resign from their union,

20Ibid.,

p.

513.
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they contested the decision

in the courts.

In Boston,

when the police who were members of the Policemen's
Union

refused to

resign,

Police Commissioner Edwin V.

Curtis announced a campaign to

recruit a voluntary

pol i c.e force. ^
Officers
to dispel

in the Boston Policemen's Union attempted

the fear that

their affiliation with the AFL

would deter members from doing their duty.
of the Boston Policemen's Union
duty as police officers
and

retain their full

Federation of Labor."

intend to do their full

in the future as

membership

"The members

in the past

in the American

Commissioner Curtis then sus¬

pended nineteen officers of the union and this was the
signal

for a strike of

1919.

Without

period of

the police force,

rioting,

“On September
sent

1500 policemen on September

looting,
12,

1919,

a twenty-four hour

and violence occurred.
Governor Calvin Coolidge

in 9,000 militiamen to keep order.

order had been partly

11,

restored.

Samuel

By September
Gompers

14,

sought

an end to the dispute by a compromise suggesting that
the striking policemen

return to work and that

the

21Phi1ip Taft, Organized Labor in American History
(New York:
Harper £■ Row, PubYi shers, i 9'ok) , p~^ 3>k6~.

221bid.
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suspensions be decided later.

The Policemen's Union

voted to accept this proposal,

but Commissioner Curtis

and the Governor found the proposal

unacceptab1e.

Neither the commissioner nor the governor would
allow rehiring of strikers.
found the time

The Central

Labor Union

inopportune for calling a general

strike,

and the policemen decided not to contest their dis¬
missals

in the courts.

Strike and
unions.

The calling of the Boston

its defeat halted the growth of police

Many of those which existed were forced to

dissolve on the threat of dismissal.^3
Labor unions did not succeed
The apparent

in the police sector.

reason for this was the public sentiment

against the use of the word "union".

What has seemingly

been more popular throughout the police history has
been fraternal

and benevolent associations.

associations existed

in the police service before the

turn of the century.
groups,

These

There are many local

and state

some of which are affiliated for professional,

educational,

and

legislative purposes.

Local

organiza¬

tions of this kind have two main objectives --to obtain
better working conditions and salaries for police
officers,

and to provide a social

231bid.,

p.

349.

outlet for officers
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with similar

interests.

The social

quently accompanied by educational
objectives

including financial

aspect

is fre¬

and benevolent

provision for families

of officers who are disabled or die.
The first major police organization was founded
in 1915 and was named the Fraternal
(FOP).

Order of Police

During the first twenty years of the organiza¬

tion's existence,

membership did not

significantly.^^4

At

its

inception,

increase
the FOP's original

purposes were directed toward securing civil

service

protection and bolstering pension systems through
lobbying.

In time,

interests to all

local

FOP lodges expanded their

police monetary

conditions as well

items and working

as emphasizing recreational

facilities

and activities.^5
In the 1930's,

the FOP began to grow.^

is the largest national

Today

it

police employee organization

and claims 90,000 members

in forty-two states.

membership consists of policemen of all

The

ranks as well

24Specific data were not available from the FOP.
. Joseph Loewenberg, "Policemen and Firemen,"
in Erne rq ? no Sectors of Col 1 ect i ve Ba rqa i n i nq, ed . by
Seymour L. Wolf be in "("Massachusetts:
D.H. Mark
Publishing Company1970), pp. 145-6.
2°Specific data were not available from the FOP.
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as citizens

in the local

associate members.^7

community who are known as

This organization does not
i

consider

itself a labor union because

it

is not

affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
The FOP is the
in the state of Rhode

largest police
Island.

labor organization

There

is a lodge

every one of the thirty-nine cities and towns
state as well
belong.

in

in the

as a state lodge to which the state police

Even though this organization

to be a union by its memberszo
be considered as a union),

is not considered

(nor do they desire to

the FOP

is the bargaining

agent for thirty-two of the thirty-nine cities and
towns.
In addition to the FOP,
organization

in Rhode

known as such.

This

there

Island which
is the

is a labor
is a union and

International

of Police Officers which was started
was founded

in Cranston,

Rhode

is

Brotherhood

in 1954.

The

IBPO

Island by seven policemen

who had been evicted from the FOP for strike activity.
In the

IBPO's seven-year history,

bargaining agent

it has become the

in seven cities and/or towns even

27 I bid.
2®This fact was stated by the majority of
viewees in this study.

inter-
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though a portion of the policemen
still

retain membership
In

National

1970,

the

in the FOP.

IBPO became affiliated with the

Association of Government

independent union,
police officers

in those communities

Employees

(NAGE),

and has now started to organize

in other states of the United States.^9

As the bargaining agents for the policemen
state,

an

in the

one of the functions that concerns each of these

organizations

is compulsory arbitration.

Comparison of State .Compulsory
Arbitration Statutes^
Since the first

binding,

statute covering employees
law

in Wyoming on May 22,

in the public sector became
1965,

met'the need for this type of
Pennsylvania
Vermont

(1968),

(1970),

Rhode

and Hawaii

law and Vermont's

compulsory arbitration

five other states have

legislation

Island
(1970).

(1968),

including:
Michigan

Although Wyoming's

law cover only fire fighters,

other five cover all

(1969),

public employees.

All

the

of the

29Although the word 'International' was in the
title of this organization, this union was operated
as a local.
This action taken in 1970 was similar to
a local affiliating with an international.
^The information provided in this section was
obtained from the statutes in each of the six states.
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statutes are permanent except that of Michigan, which
an experimental

lav; scheduled to expire on June 30,

is

1972

(see Appendix A).
Following

is a

enacted compulsory,
police.

They are

date of each

law.

list of the states that have
binding arbitration concerned with

listed according to the effective
The basic coverage of each statute

is noted.
Wyoming - Effective May 22,

1965 - The sole

public employee bargaining law in
V/yoming covers only fire fighters
employed by any regularly constituted
fire department

in any city,

town,

county and provides for binding,
pulsory arbitration to resolve
arising

in fire fighters'

Pennsylvania - Effective June 2.4,

or

com¬

impasses

negotiations.

1963 - Authorizes

collective bargaining between policemen
or firemen and their public employers,
provides for arbitration,

and requires

compliance with co11ective bargaining
agreements and findings of arbitrators.
Rhode

Island - Effective September,

1968 - There are

five public employee bargaining statutes
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in the State of Rhode

Island.

laws cover state employees,
employees and teachers.
two nearly

identical

grant bargaining
policemen,
sory,

M1chigan -

municipal

In addition,

statutes not only

rights to firemen and

but also provide for compul¬

binding arbitration to

impasses

resolve

in negotiations.

Effective October
hensive

Separate

1,

19&9 - The compre¬

Public Employment Relations Act

in Michigan extends bargaining
to all

rights

public employees except,

dictated by the constitution,
the state classified service.
experimental

law which will

June 30,

1972,

tion to

resolve

as

those

in

An

expire

provides binding arbitra¬
impasses arising

in

police and firemen's negotiations.
Vermont

-

Effective July

1,

1970 - The sole public

employee bargaining

law

in Vermont

covers only fire fighters employed by
any

regularly constituted fire

department

in any city,

town,

and provides for binding,

or county

compulsory
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arbitration to resolve

Hawa ?i

-

impasses arising

in fire fighters'

negotiations.

Effective July

1970 - The comprehen¬

1,

sive bargaining statute
• all
the

public employees.
right of

in Hawaii
This

covers

law grants

these employees

to bargain

collectively and provides for binding,
compulsory arbitration to

resolve

impasses.

Although these six statutes are concerned with
binding,

compulsory arbitration

in the public sector,

there are only two common factors
each

in them all.

law provides that an award which

is

First,

rendered by

the majority of the compulsory arbitration board members
dealing with police departments
all

parties.

Second,

each

is binding on any and

law provides for a compulsory

arbitration board composed of three members.
is established as follows:

The board

the bargaining agent

and

the corporate authority each select and name one
arbitrator and
of

immediately notify each other

the name and address of

in writing

the person selected.

These

two arbitrators then select and name a third arbitrator.
Differences among the six statutes on a variety
of

subjects

member of

include:

the selection of the neutral

the compulsory arbitration board,

the
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determination of an

impasse

of arbitration costs,

in negotiations,

and the appeal

the payment

procedures of the

awards.

Se1ect ? on of Neut ra1

Arbit rator

Since the management and union arbitrators are
required to select the neutral
often arises

arbitrator,

in which they are unable to agree on the

selection of the third member.
states,

In each of the six

provisions have been made for the selection of

the neutral

arbitrator should such a situation occur.

In Wyoming,
trict judge
neutral

the situation

the neutral

in the community;

will

be chosen from a

will

be selected by a dis¬

in Pennsylvania,

the

list of three names given

to the parties by the American Arbitration Association;
in Rhode

Island,

in Rhode

Island wi11

Michigan,

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
appoint a Rhode

resident;

in

the Chairman of the Michigan Employment

Relations Commission will

select

the Commissioner of Labor and
neutral;

Island

and

in Hawaii,

Relations Board will

Petermination of
With

the neutral;

Industry will

in Vermont,

appoint

the

the Hawaiian Public Employment

make the choice of

the third member.

Impasse

respect

to the question of when an

impasse
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really has occurred,

the states have devised the

following methods for submitting the

issue to arbitra¬

tion.
The states of Michigan,
decided an

Vermont,

and Hawaii

have

impasse occurs with the passage of a speci¬

fied time period

(usually thirty days)

after a dispute

has been submitted to mediation and fact-finding.
the end of this time period,
been

resolved,

the

arbitration board.
Wyoming define

issue will

if the dispute has not
be

resolved by an

The states of

Rhode

impasse as the party's

Island and

inability to

negotiate a settlement within thirty days of
meeting.
the

the first

After the thirty day time period has passed,

issue automatica11y goes to arbitration.

Pennsylvania

statute specifies’that

The

the failure of a

legislative body to approve a negotiated agreement
considered to be an
binding,

At

impasse and must

is

be submitted to

compulsory arbitration.

Payment of Arb ? t ration Costs
The statutes
and Hawaii

in Michigan,

provide that

Rhode

the parties

the costs of arbitration equally.

Island,

involved must bear
In the state of

Pennsylvania the public employer pays all
those for the arbitrator

Vermont,

costs except

representing the employees.
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The statute

in the state of Wyoming provides the

arbitration board with the

responsibility and authority

of determining the cost allocation

Appea1

in all

disputes.

of Awa rds
Provisions for the appeals of awards are made

Rhode

Island,

Vermont,

Wyoming,

grounds for such appeals are
board exceeding

and Michigan.

limited to an arbitration

fraud or misrepresentation to affect
Michigan also permits appeals

on the whole
any

The

its jurisdiction or participating

ported by competent,

right of appeal,

in

the award.

if the order

material,

record.

in

is unsup¬

and substantial

evidence

The Pennsylvania statutes deny
while the subject

is not discussed

in the Hawaiian statute.

Rhode I s1 and. Policemen1s
Arbitration Statute
Since

1963 policemen

have had the expressed

in the State of Rhode

legal

right

Island

to organize and join

unions for the purpose of bargaining collectively over
wages,

rates of pay,

employment.

and other terms and conditions of

The Policemen's Arbitration Act of

1963

states,
. . . the protection of the public health,
safety, and welfare demands that the full-time
policemen of any paid police department in any
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city or town not be accorded the right to strike
or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown.
It
is hereby declared to be public policy of this
state to accord to the full-time policemen of
any paid police department in any city or town
all of the rights of labor other than the right
to strike, or engage in any work stoppages or
slowdown.
To provide for the exercise of these
rights, a method of arbitrat ion of disputes is
hereby established.^1
Under this act the policemen have the right to
join unions.

The statute made

city or town,

acting through

to meet and confer

it the obligation of the

its corporate authorities,

iri good faith with the representative

of the bargaining agent.

Within ten days after

of a written request from this agent,

the parties 'must

meet for the purpose of collective bargaining.
any

receipt

Should

impasse be reached within thirty days from the

start of these negotiations,

the unresolved

issues must

be submitted to arbitration.
Within five days from the expiration of the
thirty-day period,

each of the two parties have to

select their arbitrator.
thirty-day period,
selected.

the

Within ten days after the

impartial

arbitrator must be

This tripartite arbitration board then must

start the hearings within ten days after the

of

impartial

3 ' Gene ra 1 Laws of Rhode Island 1_956, Reenactment
19o9, Vol . 5 (New" York:
Bobbs-Mer r fTT Co., irTc. ),

PP."37b-377.
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arbitrator has been named and must be concluded within
twenty days from commencement.

An additional

ten days

is granted after the conclusion of the hearings for the
arbitrators to make a written report of their findings
and a written award which

is not to exceed one year

in

du ration.
The arbitrators,

in conducting the hearings and

rendering their decision,
on the facts presented.
weight

must partially base the award
Other factors must be given

in arriving at a final

as outlined

in the statute

decision.

These factors

include:^

(1) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions
of employment of the police department in
question with prevailing wage rates or hourly
conditions of employment of skilled employees
of the bui1ding ,trades and industry in the
local operating area .involved.
(2) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions
of employment of the police department in
question with wage rates or hourly conditions
of employment of police departments in cities
or towns of comparable size.
(3)
In

Interest and welfare of the public.
1968 an amendment to the Policemen's Arbitration

Act was enacted.

The only difference between the two

laws was that tne new law made the arbitration board's
award binding on any and ail

32 Ibid.,

p.

330.

parties,

and on any and
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all

matters.

The 1963

law considered the arbitrators'

award to be advisory.
In a discussion with several
with both laws
the first

involved

it was determined that the purpose of

law.was to give the policemen rights which

were similar to those of employees
sector.

senators

in the private

The purpose of the 1968 statute was to give

the policemen not only rights similar to those of
industry,

but to have a law that would have some means

of enforcement.
It was further explained that under advisory
arbitration,

members of the corporate authority would

not acknowledge the awards.
was as follows:

if the award suggested an

monetary expenditures,
increase

The reason given for this
in

this would automatically mean an

in taxation to the.general

reasoning

increase

public.

This

is substantiated by the fact that when the

state legislature was discussing the possibility of
making the

1963 law binding,

nine municipal

thirty-eight of the thirty-

chiefs^ opposed the proposal.

The

reasoning given was that the arbitration board could be
made up of all

out-of-staters and these would be the

^Municipal chiefs are the highest elected
officials in the cities and towns.
in the cities,
the chief's title is Mayor, and in the towns, the
chief's title is Town Council President.
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persons

responsible for the setting of tax rates

in the

communities.
In order to alleviate this problem,
chiefs offered as a compromise,

a

the municipal

labor court.

This

court would consist of a specified number of members
and all would be residents of Rhode

Island.

The

legislators decided that this proposal was not accept¬
able because of the lack of competent arbitrators
the state.

In September,

the binding,

1968,

in

the legislature passed

compulsory arbitration

law.

Ana lysis of Law
The 1968 law has been
and

in this time period,

in effect for three years

two problems have re-occur red.

The first problem has been the comparisons that must be
made between policemen's
men

rates and the rates of journey¬

in the building trades.

Rhode

Most of the arbitrators

in

Island cases maintain that conclusions drawn by

the comparison of unlike occupations
sectors of the economy are lacking
unpersuas i ve.

in different

in substance and are

If comparisons have to be made other

than between police departments,

it might be more

feasible to compare occupations within the public

34Th ere is a possibility that a comparison between
the policeman in the public sector and the security
guard in the private sector may prove to be valuable.

)
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sector.

In so doing,

of our economy

those persons

in the two sectors

(public and private) could be compared

separately and perhaps more equitably.
The second problem has been concerned with the
number of unresolved

issues.

What happens

is that the

two sides bargain collectively over a number of
and at some point
just

reach an

those unresolved

impasse.

Instead of sending

issues to the arbitration board,

each side reverts to the original

position on a 11

and aj_l_ issues go to the tripartite panel.
posed a monumental

issues

issues

This has

problem in terms of time and money

spent.

Possible solutions for this problem will

offered

later

be

in this study.

Summary
Unionization of federal
early as

l800 In naval

yards.

with reference to federal

employees existed as
The first

legislation

policy toward employee

organizations was the Pendleton Act

(commonly known as

the Civil

Service Act) which was passed

this act,

only Congress had tfie authority to regulate

wages,

hours,

in

1833.

Under

and other terms and conditions of

emp 1 oymerit.
In

1912 Congress passed the Lloyd~La Follette Act,

which became the basis for the principle that

federal
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employees had the right to join any organization that
did not assert the right to strike against the govern¬
ment.
President Kennedy furthered the rights of federal
employees when he signed Executive Order 10938
January,

1962.

This made

in

it possible for federal

employees to have the protected right to join unions
and engage

in collective bargaining with the federal

agencies for whom they worked.
Police unionization began

in the early 1900's.

The Fraternal

Order of Police was founded

began to grow

in the

largest national

1930's.

in 1915,

The FOP today

and

is the

police employee organization and

claims 90,000 members

in forty-two states.

Only six states have statutes that provide for
binding arbitration.
this chapter.
Statute

A comparison of each

The Rhode

is discussed

in

Island Policemen's Arbitration

in detail.

*

is made
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CHAPTER

IV

PROCEDURES AND METHOD OF

INVESTIGATION

This chapter is concerned primarily with the
methodology used

in this study.

The topics covered are

(1) definitions of the words or phrases used

in

the study;
(2) hypotheses tested and their relationship to
the study;
(3) methodology used
(4) general

in the study;

and

information on the sample used.

Definitions
Each of the key words and/or phrases used
study shall
section.

have the definitions as explained

The purpose of these definitions

in this

in this

is to enable

readers to understand the hypotheses and methodology
utilized throughout the study.
understanding of this
the terms used

report,

in the study

To assist

in a common

a uniform definition of

is critical.

Po 1 i cernen
"The term 'policemen'

shall

mean the full-time

police from the rank of patrolman up to arid
the rank of chief,

including

including policewomen of any
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particular police department

in any city or town within

the state.1 11 ^

Emp1oyee Organizat ? on
Employee organization
tion of any kind

is defined as any organiza¬

in which policemen participate and

which exists for the primary purpose of dealing with
the corporate authority concerning grievances,
disputes, wages,

hours,

labor

and other terms and conditions

of employment of policemen.^

Exc1 usive Representation
Exclusive

representation means that the employee

organization has the

right to be the collective bar¬

gaining agent of all

policemen

in an appropriate

bargaining unit without discrimination and without
regard to employee organization membership.^

Representative
Representative means any

individual

or

individuals

1 Genera1 Laws of Rhode Island 1956, Reenactment
of 1969.
("Pocket Supplement Vol . 5 New York:
BobbsMerrill Co., Inc.), p. 4816.
2Genera1 Laws of Hawai? 1970.
Washington, D.C.:
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970, p. 13.
3 | b i d.
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acting for the corporate authority or the policemen and
snail’ include employee organizations.

Corporate Author ? ty
"The term 'corporate authority'

shall

mean the

proper officials within any city or town whose duty or
duties
pay,

it

is to establish the wages,

salaries,

rates of

hours, working conditions of employment of police¬

men, whether they be the mayor,
manager,

town administrator,

director of personnel,

city manager,

city council,

personnel

town

town council,

board or commission or

by whatever other name the same may be designated,

or

any combination thereof."**

Superv ? sory Emp1oyee
Supervisory employee means any
authority
to hire,

in the

men,
them,

having

interest of the corporate authority

transfer,

discharge,

individual

assign,

suspend,
reward,

layoff,

recall,

promote,

or discipline other police¬

or the responsibility to assign work to and direct
or to adjust their grievances,

actions,

or recommend such

if the exercise of such authority

is not

4Genera1 Laws of Rhode Is1 and 1956, Reenactment
of 1969~
(Pocket Supplement Vol. 5 New York:
Bobbs"Rerrill Co., Inc.), p. 4816.
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merely routine or clerical,

but

requires

independent

j udgment.5

Co 11ective Ba rqaininq
"Collective bargaining means the performance of
the mutual

obligation of the corporate authority and

the exclusive representative to'meet at
times,

to confer and negotiate

reasonable

in good faith,

and to

execute a written agreement with respect to wages,
hours,

and other terms and conditions of employment,

except that by any such obligation neither party shall
be compelled to agree to a proposal,

or be required to

make a concession."0

Labor Dispute
The term labor dispute

includes any controversy

between the corporate authority and the policemen or
their representatives concerning terms,

tenure or

conditions of employment or concerning the association
or represent ation of persons

5Genera1

Laws of Hawaii

in negotiating,

1970,

p.

fixing,

13.

6 Ib ? d.
For add itional information on definitions
of collective bargaining, see Section 8 (d), LaborManagement Relations Act, 19^7 or C. V/11 son Randle and
Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargaining (2nd ed.;
Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company^ 1 9o6), pp. 5-8.
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maintaining,

changing,

or seeking to negotiate,

fix,

maintain or change terms or conditions of employment.'7

Impasse
Impasse means the failure of a corporate authority
and an exclusive representative to achieve agreement

in

the course of collective bargaining.

S t r i ke
Strike

is described as a policeman's

concerted action with others,
his wilful
of work,
full,

faithful,

employment,

in whole or

in

or

or his stoppage
in part from the

and proper performance of the duties of

for the purpose of

or coercing a change
rights,

to report for duty,

absence from this position,

or his abstinence

refusal,

privileges,

inducing,

in the conditions,

influencing,
compensation,

or obligations of public employ¬

ee—

ment.

Fact-Findinq
Fact-finding is defined as the
the major

issues

in a particular

identification of

impasse,

review of the

positions of the parties and resolutions of factual

7Rhode I s1 and State Labor Re 1 at 1 ons Act, (Rhode
Island:
Rhode Island State Labor Re 1 at ions Board), p.
^Genera 1

Laws of Hawai?

19/0,

p.

13.

3.

differences by one or more
the making of

impartial

fact-finders,

and

recommendations for settlement of the

impasse.

Med i ation
Mediation

is the assistance by an

party to reconcile an

impartial

third

impasse between the corporate

authority and the exclusive representative regarding
wages,

hours,

and other terms and conditions of

employment through

interpretation,

advice to resolve the

suggestion,

and

impasse.9.

Arbit ration
Arbitration
involved

in an

is the procedure whereby parties

impasse mutually agree to submit their

differences to a third party for a final

and binding

decision.

Cornpu 1 sory A rb i t rat i on
Compulsory arbitration

is the procedure whereby

public law requires the corporate authority and the
policemen to submit their differences to a third party
for a final

and binding decision,

and to prohibit work

stoppages.

^Genera1

Laws of Hawaii

1970>

p.

13.
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Compu1sory Arbitration Board
Compulsory arbitration board means the panel
three persons who will

meet and decide on any

of

impasse

between the corporate authority and the exclusive
representative.

Ope rationa1

Procedu res

Operational

procedures mean the precise method of

handling arbitration cases and the mode of
workings of the board.
board shall

The

internal

internal workings of the

be considered to be formal

if the proceed¬

ings of the board's decision-making process are similar
to those used

in a court of

workings shall

Type of

law.

be classified as

Otherwise the

internal

informal.

Issue

Type of

issue means the distinction between wage

issues and non-wage

issues.

V/age

issues shall

include

anything dealing with monetary values such as the
determination of wages,

hours and work scheduling,

pension plans and health and welfare plans.
issues shall

Non-wage

include anything dealing with non-monetary

values such as seniority,

discipline,

and job security.

Form of Government
Form of government means the distinction made by
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the State of Rhode

Island as to the municipalities

classified as cities and those classified as towns.
Those municipalities which have been designated as
cities are classified as such upon the request of the
people residing within certain geographical
contingent upon approval

by the state

General
This section
the operational

boundaries,

legislature.

Hypotheses

includes the general

hypotheses which will

hypotheses and

be used to con¬

sider some of the effects of compulsory arbitration
boards upon police labor-management

relations

in the

State of Rhode

Island.

Hypot hes ? s J_:

The more urban the geographic location,
the more

likely’a compulsory arbitration

board will

be used

in settling disputes

between the union and the corporate
authority.
According to Loewenberg,
passes

the resolution of

in negotiations by compulsory arbitration

im¬
in the

state of Pennsylvania did not seem to be related to the
size of the locality.

There

resolution of

in some

impasses

is some evidence that the
localities were obtained
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through compulsory arbitration.^
whether or not
arbitration

In order to determine

impasses have been resolved by compulsory

in the State of Rhode

Island,

the following

operational ‘hypotheses were established:

Ope rationa1

Hypothesis _h

statistically significant
the population

There

is no

relationship between

in a geographic location and the

utilization of a compulsory arbitration board.

Ope rationa1

Hypothesis

I I:

statistically significant
the form of government

There

is no

relationship between

in a geographic location

and the utilization of a compulsory arbitration
boa rd.

Hypothesis
•_

I I:

The greater the proportion of union
members

in the bargaining unit,

the

greater the chances of using the
compulsory arbitration board.
Professor Loewenberg also
is there an absence of a
of the city

indicated that not only

relationship between the size

(and/or town),

and an

impasse being resolved

^Oj. Joseph Loewenberg, "Compulsory Arbitration
for Police and Fire Fighters in Pennsylvania in 1968,"
I ndustrial and Labor Re 1 at ions Rev 1ew, Volume 23,
Number~3 [April, \310Y. P~- 3o9.
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by compulsory arbitration',

but there was no indication

of any relationship between the size of the local

police

force and the use of a compulsory arbitration board.
In addition to this relationship brought forth by
Professor Loewenberg,

a condition which also should be

examined would be the type of union security that exists
within a particular police department.
very few union members

If there were

in the bargaining unit,

union may not be powerful enough to force an
compulsory arbitration.

the

issue to

This kind of relationship will

be examined by means of operational

hypothesis

IV.

When compulsory arbitration has to be used,
information regarding the types of proceedings must be
known for the purpose of preparing for the arbitration
hearing--the event where cases are won or lost.
of proceedings would be defined as the formal
ings and the

informal

The operational
test this general

Types

proceed¬

proceedings.
hypotheses which v/i 11

be used to

hypothesis are as follows:

Operational Hypothesis

III:

statistically significant

There

is no

relationship between

the number of full-time policemen in a geographic
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location and the utilization of a compulsory
a rbit ration boa rd.
#

Ope rationa1

Hypothes1s

I V:

statistically sign.ificant
the number of members

There

is no

relationship between

in a bargaining unit and

the utilization of a compulsory arbitration
boa rd.

Ope rat i ona 1

Hypot hes i s _V:

significant

relationship between the number of

members

There

is no

in the bargaining unit and the formal

operational
boa rd wi11

procedures the compulsory arbitration
use.

Ope rationa1

Hypothesis V1:

There

significant

relationship between the type of

issue to be decided and the formal

is no

operational

procedures the compulsory arbitration board
will

use.

Hypothesis

Ml:

The presence of a compulsory arbitra¬
tion board has had an effect on the
labor-management

relations

in those

communities that have had an experience
with a compulsory arbitration board.
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According to Northrup,

no institution or method

of determining conditions of work is,
perfectly satisfactory to everyone.
more

important to both the

individual

or can be,
But few things are
and society than

the methods of determining the conditions under which
individuals buy and sell
labor.

The successful

under which these

each other's and their own

determination of the conditions

individuals must operate

lies

in

whether or not a form of emergency strike legislation
could be devised which does not
bargaining.

inhibit collective

Professor Northrup's evidence

that compulsory arbitration:
in a working environment,

(1) does not

action;

and

insure peace

but can breed strikes;

(2) enhances union power and growth,
political

indicates

especially through

(3) discourages collective

ba rgaining.^
To attempt to determine

if these conditions exist

in police departments

in the State of-Rhode

following operational

hypotheses will

conjunction with

Island the

be used

in

later ones to test the general

^Herbert R. Northrup, Compu1 sory Arbitration
and Government Intervention in Labor Disputes
(Washington, D.C.:
Labor Policy Association, Inc.,
1966), pp. 179-180.
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hypothesis:

Ope rationa1

Hypothesis VII:

Pol icemen feel

that

the compulsory arbitration board has affected the
collective bargaining process.
i

Ope rationa1

Hypothesis VIII:

corporate authority feel

Members of the

that the compulsory

arbitration board has affected the collective
bargaining process.
Price has

indicated that a board's

impact on

morale could be determined to the extent to which
individual

motives are satisfied by the organization.

Some customary measures of morale are turnover,
absenteeism,

accidents,

tardiness,

and verbal

state¬

ments of satisfaction.^
The following operational

hypotheses will

to examine this aspect of the labor-management
noted

in the general

Ope rationa1
increase

be used
relations

hypothesis:

Hypothesis

1X:

The percentage

in wages has been greater subsequent to

to the enactment of the compulsory arbitration

1 3
^James L. Price, "The Impact of Governing Boards
on Organizationa1 Effectiveness and Morale,"
Administ rative Science Qua rte r1y, Volume 8, Number 3
(December, 19o3), pp. 3o2-3b3.
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law than prior to the

Ope rat i ona 1

law.

Hypothes i s X_:

The grievance

rate

(in per cent) has been greater subsequent to the
enactment of the compulsory arbitration

law than

prior to the law.

Methodo1ogy
This section describes the sources of data and the
methods used

in this study.

In addition,

for analyzing the data will

be presented.

will

be divided

The section

into the following categories:

(1) Sources of data;
and

the procedures

(2) Methods for obtaining data;

(3) Analysis of data.

Sources of Data
*

There will
will

be used

the Statutes

be two primary sources of data which

in this survey.

The first source will

in the State of Rhode

Number Seven of the General

Section

Laws of the State of Rhode

Island dealing with Labor and
be used to obtain

Island.

be

Industrial

Relations will

information concerning compulsory

arbit rat ion.
The second primary source of data will

be persons

that have had experience with compulsory arbitration
boards

in their community.

The persons to be

included
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are as follows:
' (1) The top ranking officer of the policeman's
association

in each community

in which a

campulsory arbitration board has functioned;
(2) The.top ranking official
authority

of the corporate

in each community

in which a

compulsory arbitration board has functioned;
(3) The personnel

director

in each community

in

which a compulsory arbitration board has
functioned;
(4)

and

Each of the three arbitrators who decided the
issue or

issues

in each community.^

Methods for Obtaining Data
The methodological
parts.

First,

there will

procedure consists of three
be a detai1ed ana 1ysis of the

state law which provides for the
compulsory arbitration board.

implementation of the

The coverage of this

law

14According to state law, within twenty-five
calendar days from the date of the first meeting
between the bargaining agents and the corporate
authority, these two parties shall each select and name
one arbitrator.
These two arbitrators so selected and
named shall agree upon and select and name a third
arbitrator.
Thus the compulsory arbitration board
consists of three persons:
one considered to be the
union arbitrator, one considered to be the corporate
authority arbitrator, and one considered to be the
neutral arbitrator.
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regarding compulsory arbitration
General

Laws of the State of Rhode

Second,
Appendix B),
interviewed.
be

is

included

in the

Island.

using structured questionnaires

(see

each of the selected persons will

be

It should be noted that each person will

interviewed with a questionnaire devised especially

for persons

in that category.

The questions for each

category are worded so as to facilitate analysis of the
hypotheses.

Ana lysis of Data
The data which are obtained from the questionnaire
will

be used to test each of the operational

hypo¬

theses . 1 5
Twelve communities

in the State of Rhode

have used compulsory arbitration boards.
analysis will

Island

A general

be based on specific answers received to

the questionnaires.

Since the same questions10 are

asked of the different types of

interviewee the various

responses may be compared which may enable generaliza¬
tions to be made.

^For an analysis of the questions that apply to
each hypothesis, see Appendix C.

16 See Appendix C.
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General

Information

The compulsory binding arbitration law concerning
i

police departments

in the State of Rhode

Providence Plantations was enacted
From this date to March 31,

1971,

Island and

in September,

1968.

compulsory binding

arbitration has been

implemented fourteen times

in

twelve communities.

Of these twelve

seven

locations,

were classified as cities with a population ranging
from 18,716 to 179,213 and a police force consisting of
36 to 414 total
In addition,

law enforcement officers respectively.

two of these cities have used binding

arbitration more than once.

Five of the

locations were

classified as towns with a population ranging from
2,911

to 26,605 and a police force

ranging from seven

to thirty respectively.
In the State of Rhode

Island there are two organ¬

izations to which policemen may belong--one organization
is the Fraternal
FOP.

The other

Police Officers,

Order of Police,
is the

commonly known as the

International

often known as the

the twelve communities studied,

Brotherhood of
IBPO.

In eight of

the FOP was the recog¬

nized bargaining agent for the policemen, while the
represented the policemen

IBPO

i ri the other four.

In five of the twelve communities,

all

of the

law
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enforcement officers were members of either the FOP or
the

IBPO.

The

remaining seven communities had at

one non-member of the union

least

in the police department.

In six of these seven cases the chief was considered to
be the non-member and was excluded from membership by
agreement between labor and the corporate authority.
In addition to the chief's exclusion,

two communities

had other high ranking members of the police force also
excluded by agreement.
Finally,

in four communities of the twelve,

at

least one member of the rank and file did not wish to
be a member of any bargaining unit and was excluded.

Summa ry
Included

in this chapter

is a presentation of the

definition of terms used throughout the study,
general

hypotheses,

the operational

hypotheses,

procedures and method of data collection.

the
and the
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CHAPTER

V

RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this chapter
results of the study.
chapter

include:

(1)

The three sections

in this

response to survey;

related to the hypotheses;
the opinion questions

is to describe the

and

(3)

(2)

results

regarding binding,

results

related to

compulsory

a rbit ration.

Response to Survey
The twelve communities which have been
with binding,
Central

compulsory arbitration are:

Falls,

Providence,

Cranston,

Pawtucket,

V/est Warwick,

Cumberland,

Providence,

and Woonsocket.

form of government,

involved

Bristol,

Jamestown,

North

Tiverton, Warwick,

Table 5.1

indicates the

population statistics,

and number

of police officers for each locality.
The small
to interview all
binding,
the total
be

size of Rhode

Island made

the parties that had been

compulsory arbitration
of sixty-five persons,

for an

involved

in each community.

in
Of

sixty-four agreed to

interviewed for a 93.4 per cent

Table 5.2).

it possible

response

(see

The only person that did not provide time

interview was a police chief

(see Table 5.3).
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TABLE 5.1
COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS
OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS
IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971

Communit y

Form of
Numbe r
Gove rnof Police
Office rs
Popu1 ation
ment

Bristol

Town

17,860

24

Cent ra1 Falls

City

18,716

36

Cranston

City

73,037

105

Cumbe r1 and

Town

26,605

30

Jamestown

Town

2,91 1

7

North Providence

Town

24,337

31

•

Pawtucket

City

76,984

153

P rovidence

City

179, 213

414

Tive rton

Town

12,559

15

Wa rwick

City

83,694

150

West Warwick

Town

24,323

38

Woonsocket

City

46,820

101
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TABLE 5.2
RESPONSE OF PERSONS TO SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE STUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971

Person

Respondent
Non-respondent
Total

Number Percent

64

98.4

1

1.6

65

100.0
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TABLE 5.3
RESPONSE OF COMMUNITIES TO STATISTICAL DATA IN THE STUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971

Community

Respondent
Non-respondent
Total

Number

Percent

1 1

91.5

1

8.5

1 2

100.0
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In one other community some difficulty was encountered
in gathering statistical
absentee

data.

Turnover rates and

rates could not be obtained because the

information would have to have been abstracted from
each policeman's confidential

personal

grievance rates and the salary rates
were not classified,

file.

Since the

in this community

they were provided for the study.

In this study the following persons were to be
inte rviewed:
(1) The top ranking officer of the policemen's
assoc i at i on.;
(2) The top ranking official

of the corporate

authority;
(3) The personnel

director;

(4) Each of the three arbitrators

involved with

the decisions.
No difficulties were encountered

in

interviewing the

twelve officers of the policemen's association or the
twelve officials of the corporate authority.
of the twelve communities had personnel
of whom were

interviewed.

not have a personnel

directors--a 11

In six communities that did

director,

interviewed using the personnel
In the seventh community,

Only five

the chief of police was
directors'

questionnaire.

the police chief did not
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coope rate.
Of the fourteen binding arbitration cases heard
in the twelve communities,

nine persons were employed

as corporate authority arbitrators.

One of the nine

heard five cases,

and the remaining

another heard two,

seven heard one each.

There were seven union arbitrators,

one person having served on five cases,
having served on four,
Eight neutral

and the remainder on one each.

arbitrators were employed,

were appointed three times,
twice,

another person

two of whom

two others were appointed

and the four remaining once each
On 1y one arbitrator was named

(see Table 5.4).

in two capacities.

In one case he was appointed by the union while
another he was a neutral.

This practice

in

is not encour¬

aged by any parties since labels are not easily attached
to such

individuals.

authorities,

Unions,

as well

as corporate

prefer to choose someone they are able to

trust and who will work diligently for their

interests.

From observations

be very

in this study,

it may well

difficult for this person to be selected as an arbiter
again as several

interviewees felt that he could not be

trusted by the parties.
The occupations of the arbiters differ widely.
Ten

(42 per cent) of the twenty-four total

arbitrators
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TABLE 5.4
NUMBER OF CASES HEARD BY ARBITRATORS
IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971

Number of Cases Heard

A rbit rator*

1

2

3

4

5

Corporate Authority

7

1

0

0

1

Un i on

5

0

0

1

1

Neut ra1

4

2

2

• O'

0
L

*0ne arbitrator was named

in two capacities.

3h
interviewed were attorney-s,

seven

(29 per cent) were

associated with the teaching profession,
cent) were businessmen,
of the clergy,

and two

two

three

(13 per

(8 per cent) were members

(8 per cent) were full-time

arbiters.

Results Related to the Hypotheses
The results of the survey as
hypotheses set forth
this section.
hypothesis will

in Chapter

In each case,

related to the

IV will

be discussed

the original working

be stated followed by an analysis of

the data used to test the hypothesis.

On completion of

the analysis of the working hypotheses,
will

be drawn on the general

Popu1 at 1 on

in

conclusions

hypotheses.

in a Geoqraph ? c Location

Ope rat ? ona 1

Hypothes ? s J_:

There

-statistically significant
the population

is no

relationship between

in a geographic location and the

utilization of a compulsory arbitration board.

Using the Chi-square test of
is a statistically significant

independence,

there

relationship between

geographic location and the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board.^

Operational

^ A11 Chi-square tests of
the .95 level of significance.

hypothesis one

is

independence were run at

95
therefore rejected.
The contingency coefficient used to determine the
degree of association between two variables
that these two are closely related^

indicates

(see Table 5.5).

Form of Government
Ope rationa1

Hypothesis

1 I:

statistically significant
the form of government

There

is no

relationship between

in a geographic location

and the utilization of a compulsory arbitration
board.

There is a statistically significant

relationship

betv/een the form of government and the utilization of
a compulsory arbitration board.

Operational

hypothesis

tv/o is rejected.
The contingency coefficient of

.433

indicates that

the degree of association betv/een these tv/o variables
is strong

(see Table 5.6).

Locat i on of Cor.pu 1 sory Arb ? t rat ion Usage
There are tv/o of a possible nineteen localities

= .546.
In a two-by-tv/o contingency table,
the maximum value of C is .707.
For information on the
maximum value of C, see:
Sidney Siegal, Nonpa ramet ric
Statistics for the Behaviora1 Sciences (New York:
McGraw-Hi11 Book Company, Inc.^ i956), p. 195-202.
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TABLE 5.5
ANALYSIS OF THE POPULATION SIZE AND THE UTILIZATION OF
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971
N=39

Popu1 at ion Size

Uti1ization
of Board

019,999

•

20,000
& Ove r Tota 1

Yes

4

8

1 2

No

22

5

2.7

26

13

39

Total

2=16.6
y2.95=3.84

d/f=1
C= .-546;

Cmax=.707

Si.nce the derived value of
the Chi-square is less than the
value of Chi-square at the .95
level of significance, the hypo¬
thesis of the independence between
the population in a community and
the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board is rejected.

%
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TABLE 5.6
ANALYSIS OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE UTILIZATION
OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971
N=39

Form of Government
Utilization
of Boa rd

Tota 1
City

Town

Yes

6

6

1 2

No

2

25

27

8

31

39

Tota 1

y 2=8.96

d/f=1

i'1.95=3.84

C=.433;

Cmax=. 707

Since the derived value of the
Chi-square is less than the value of
Chi-square at the .95 level of sig¬
nificance, the hypothesis of the
independence between the form of
government in a community and the
utilization of a compulsory arbitra¬
tion board is rejected.
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with a population figure of under 15,000 that have gone
to binding arbitration

(see Appendix D,

Binding arbitration has been used
communities

in

10 per cent of the

in this population class to settle contract

disputes with the police departments.
that

Table 1).

list the population size as

In communities

15,000 and over,

per cent have used binding arbitration.
with a population of over 50,000,
binding,

In communities

33 per cent have used

compulsory arbitration.

Moreover,
in Rhode

50

six of the eight city police departments

Island have resorted to binding,

arbitration

compulsory

(75 per cent), whereas only six towns of a

possible thirty-one

(19 per cent),

have utilized binding

arbit rat ion.
These data and the statistical
reported

data previously

lead to the rejection of operational

numbers one and two,

hypotheses

and would tend to support general

hypothesis number one, which stated:
the geocraph1c 1ocation,
a rbit ration boa rd will

the more

be used

The more urban

1 ? ke1y a compu1 sory

in sett 11nq d ? sputes

between t he union and the corporate author ? ty.
What these data mean to Rhode
practical

significance

Island

in terms of

is that the cities may well

used as the pattern setters for the towns.

be

If the union
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is able to concentrate

its pressure against the major

cities, which seem to be most susceptible to agreement
on favorable terms,

it may be able to use those terms

as the pattern for the smaller localities.
pattern set by. the cities,

With the

the burden may be placed on

other communities to show-why they cannot grant terms
at

least as favorable.

ties can

If some less prosperous communi¬

indeed make such a showing,

lessened to a degree,

the terms may be

but only after rigorous bargaining.

Full -T ime Po1icemen
Ope rat ? ona1

Hypothesis

111:

statistically significant

There

is no

relationship between

the number of full-time policemen

in a geographic

location and the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board.

An analysis of the data
significant
policemen

indicates that there

is a

relationship between the number of full-time

in a geographic location and the utilization

of a compulsory arbitration board.
thesis number three
In addition,

is

Operational

rejected.

some relationship

is

indicated

between these two variables as the contingency
coefficient equals

.370

hypo¬

(see Table 5.7).
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TABLE 5.7
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF POLICEMEN IN A COMMUNITY AND
THE UTILIZATION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN
RHODE ISLAND, 1971
N=39

dumber of Policemen

Ut i 1ization
of Board

Yes
No
Total

034

35
& Ove r

T ota 1

5

7

12

22

5

27

27

1 2

39

^'.2=6.14

d/f = 1

-^l2.95=3.84

C=. 370;

Cmax=.707

Since the derived value of Chisquare is less than the value of Ch i square at the .95 level of significance,
the hypothesis of the independence be¬
tween the number of policemen in a
community and the utilization of a
compulsory arbitration board is rejected.

*
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Barqaininq Unit
Ope rationa1

Hypothesis

I V:

statistically significant
the number of members

There

is no

relationship between

in a bargaining unit and

the utilization of a compulsory arbitration board.

There

is a statistically significant

between the number of members

relationship

in a bargaining unit and

the utilization of a compulsory arbitration board,
leading to the rejection of operational

thus

hypothesis

number four.
The contingency coefficient of
that there
variables

.410

indicates

is some relationship between these two
(see Table 5.8).

Members Versus Ope rationa1
Ope rat ? ona1

Procedures^

Hypothesis V:

There

is no significant

relationship between the number of members
bargaining unit and the formal

in the

operational

procedures the compulsory arbitration board will
use.

To determine whether or not a
between the number of members

^See Appendix D,

relationship existed

in a bargaining unit and

Tables 2 and 3.
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TABLE 5.8
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN A COMMUNITY'S POLICE
LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE UTILIZATION OF COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971
N=39

Nurnbe r of Members

Utilization
of Board

034

35
& Ove r

Total

Yes

5

7

1 2

No

23

4

27

28

1 1

39

Total

^2=7.67

d/ f -1

^2.95=3.84 '

C =.41 0;

Cmax=.707

Since the derived value of the
Chi-square is less than the.value of
Chi-square at the .95 level of sig¬
nificance, the hypothesis of the
independence between the number of
members in a police labor organiza¬
tion and the utilization of a
compulsory arbitration board is rejected.

%
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the formality of operational
arbitration board,

procedures used by the

the arbitrators employed

in each of

the communities were questioned as to the degree of
formality used by each board.

The results

indicate

that 91.6 per cent of the arbitrators selected by the
union perceived the operational
the board

(that

is,

the swearing

presentation of facts,

procedures followed by
in of witnesses,

evidence that would be accepted,

and the procedures of the hearings) as formal,
cent of the neutral
as formal,

71.^+ per

arbitrators perceived the procedures

and only 33.3 per cent of the corporate

authority arbitrators felt this way.
twelve communities all
procedures were formal.
four communities

three arbitrators

indicated the

Two out of three arbitrators

in

indicated that their procedures

followed a formal
arbitrators stated
communities.

In two of the

pattern, while two out of three
informal

operations existed

In one community all

that the operational

in five

arbitrators stated

procedures were of an

informal

natu re.
It appears from these data that the degree of
formality or
arbitrators

informality as

indicated by each of the

is definitely a matter of perception.

is possible that the union arbitrators,

It

after witnessing
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loosely run union meetings,
proceedings to be formal

perceive the arbitration

in contrast to such meetings.

The corporate authority arbitrator may be used to
operating very formally and his perception of the
proceedings may be one of

informality.

I ssues Versus Ope rationa1

Procedure

Ope rationa1

Hypothes ? s V I:

There

relationship between the type of
decided and the formal

is no significant
issue to be

operational

compulsory arbitration board will

Identical
operational

issue was decided.

issue,

non-v/age

In every case,

procedures was
operational

in each

regardless of the type of

to the views portrayed for

hypothesis number five.^
is no significant

^Neither wage nor non-v/age
in depth.
^See Appendix D,

implemented,

perception of the operational

identical

indicate that there

instance

In addition to the wage

issues also were decided

issue the arbitrators'

respect to

In every

compu1sory arbitration was

a wage

community.^

use.

results are obtained with

hypothesis number six.

where binding,

procedures the

Table 3.

The data tend to
relationship

issues v/ere

investigated
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between the type of
operational
board wi11

issue to be decided and the

procedures the compulsory arbitration
use.

Membe rship and Uti1j zat ? on of Arbitration
As noted,

there

is a statistically significant

relationship between the number of full-time policemen
in a geographic location and the utilization of a
compulsory arbitration board and the number of members
in a bargaining unit and the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board.

In addition .there

indicate that general
accepted.

It stated:

union members

is evidence to

hypothesis number two should be
The greater the proportion of

in the bargaininq unit the qreater the

•chances of using the compu1sory a rbit ration boa rd.
The practical
Rhode- Island

significance of these fundings for

is that power relations do exist

collective bargaining process.
et.

in the

According to Selekman,

a 1.,
It i s by mobilizing their power, economic,
political, and moral--that workers and their
leaders compel management.in the first instance
to deal with them and then to grant, in whole
or in part, the demands which they make upon the
corporation.
It is by countering with power-economic, political, and moral--that corporate
management determines how much and to what extent
it will deal with its employees through organ-

%
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ized unions.6
This

is exactly what has been happening

in Rhode

Island since the enactment of the compulsory arbitration
statu.te.

The police organizations know that they now

have a powerful

tool

less able to use

and the corporate authority seems

it as efficiently.

If the corporate authority and the union do not
recognize these power components as the critical
ments
other,

ele¬

in determining their relationships with each
they are being naive and run the risk of jeopard¬

izing effective positive relations.

This

is not to say

that other values do not have an effect on these
relationships.

Factors such as the nature and history

of the relationship,
the positions of
conditions all

types of personalities that occupy

leadership,

and prevailing economic

have an effect of this relationship.

Po1icemen
Ope rationa1

Hypothesis VII:

Pol icemen feel

that

the compulsory arbitration board has affected the
collective bargaining process.

Policemen

interviewed expressed

little doubt that

^Benjamin H. Selekman, e_t. aj_. , Probl ems i n Labor
Re 1 ations (3rd ed.; New York:
McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1964). pp. 4-9.
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compulsory arbitration has affected the collective
bargaining process.

In eleven of the twelve communities

it was reported that prior to binding arbitration there
was a "take

it or leave

administration.
viewed,

it" attitude on the part of the

According to union officials

inter¬

this same attitude prevailed even under advisory

arbitration.

Apparently the city administrators believed

that they did not have to comply with the arbitrator's
decision.
Since the advent of binding,

compulsory arbitration,

collective bargaining has become more realistic according
to

interviewees.

One officer felt that

it forces

administration officials to listen and to be more
agreeable to the organization.
obvious kind of

response,

In addition to this

compulsory arbitration forces

the corporate authority to offer proposals and counter¬
proposals more
established

rapidly.

A time-table has been

in the law and

within a stated period,

if a decision

the unresolved

is not

reached

issues auto¬

matically go to arbitration.
The collective bargaining process has also been
affected because the policemen say they now have a
procedure to follow if they do not approve the package
offered by the administration and this procedure does
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not denigrate their public image.
The one union official who reported that binding,
compulsory arbitration did not have any effect on
collective bargaining would make no further comment as
to why he felt this way.
Ten of the eleven persons who noted the positive
effect on collective bargaining stated that
instance did binding,

in no

compulsory arbitration discourage

collective bargaining.

Binding arbitration enhances

collective bargaining they said because there
equalization of power.

is an

Each side knows the other has a

weapon and therefore each

is more realistic at the

negotiating table.
The two persons who stated that compulsory
arbitration discouraged collective bargaining were from
small

towns with small

police forces.

It was the

opinion of these two that the administration officials
knew that there was

little money

in the union treasury

and the union could not afford to go to arbitration.
Since there would be no arbitration hearing there was
no weapon to bargain

in good faith,

and collective bar¬

gaining was discouraged.^

^Contrary to the opinion of these two men, union
organizations at the next level or at the international
level would not permit the local union to be dissolved.
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Union officials

interviewed expressed mixed

opinions on the effect of compulsory arbitration as a
means of

increasing their power and growth,

equalizing the power of both parties.
officials

thereby

Seven union

(58 per cent) felt that policemen

in Rhode

Island had discovered how much could be obtained
terms of benefits

(both wage and non-wage)

in

if they

banded together to enhance power and growth.

The five

union officials who stated there was no effect between
compulsory arbitration and a union's power and growth
also stated that only the strike weapon could affect a
union's power and growth.
Regarding whether or not compulsory arbitration
is a means to municipal
(33 per cent)

reported

four union officials,
each

peace,

four union officials

it was not.
it

According to the

is known by both parties that

is bound by the decision of the compulsory

arbitration board and this has been a factor
morale.

never be able to deal with the

complexities of any one single dispute.
arbitration board make a decision and

Having an

leaving the

implementation of the decision to the parties

said.

improved

The eight union officials stated that the

arbitration process will

does not

in

involved

reduce hostilities which may be present,

they

no
Corporate Authority
Ope rationa1

Hypothesis VIII:

corporate authority feel

Members of the

that the compulsory

arbitration board has affected the collective
bargaining process.

Eleven of twelve administrators stated that
compulsory arbitration had an effect on collective
bargaining.
negative.

This effect has been both positive and
On the positive side,

compulsory arbitration

was said to force both parties to pay more attention to
collective bargaining.
advisory

in nature,

When arbitrators'

awards were

members of the corporate authority

admittedly disregarded any decisions of which they did
not approve.
authority

Now that awards are binding,

the corporate

is apprehensive about the possibility of an

unjust award,
to pay or to

that

is,

unjust

in the sense of ability

implement an unclear award.

Agreements

reached under collective bargaining are far superior to
arbitration,

according to administrators.

One negative effect that compulsory arbitration
has had on collective bargaining

is said to be the

reluctance of the corporate authority to make known
final offer

in negotiations.

its

The reason given for this'

is that administrators are apprehensive of the results

should the case go to arbitration after the last offer
is made known.

Under these conditions the starting

point for arbitration would be at the level

of the last

offer and this may prohibit good faith bargaining.
Although agreeing with the unions by stating that
compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collective
bargaining,
differ

the members of the corporate authority

in the way they said bargaining has been affected

While ten union officials

(83 per cent)

reported that

compulsory arbitration enhanced collective bargaining,
eleven corporate authority officials

(92 per cent)

stated that compulsory arbitration discouraged collec¬
tive bargaining.

It

is generally felt that since the

union now has a weapon,
desire to use

it.

compulsory arbitration,

Administrators feel

they

that attitudes

of "what can we lose?" on the part of a union make
bargaining difficult

if not

impossible.

Eight members of the corporate authority

(61

per

cent) felt that the unions power and growth have been
enhanced by compulsory arbitration,
that there was no effect.

and four reported

Ten of a possible twelve

stated that compulsory arbitration did not
likelihood of municipal

improve the

peace because the policemen

could see that awards give them more,

causing them to

1 1 2
want even more.

They would be willing to pay the

expense of arbitration to obtain this they said.

Salary Rates
Ope rat ? ona1
crease

Hypothesis

IX:

The percentage

in¬

in wages has been greater subsequent to

the enactment of the compulsory arbitration law
than prior to the law.

Salary rates have fluctuated from 1965 through
1970,

but each year the average raise for police

officers was

living.^

in excess of the rise

In 1966 the average

exceeded the cost of
2.4%,

living

in 1968 by 1.9%,

in the cost of

increase for policemen

index by 0.1%,

in 1969 by 5.6%,

in

and

in

1967 by
1970 by

3.2% (see Table 5.9).
From 1965 to the enactment of the compulsory
arbitration law in 1968,
did not award salary
Since the
all

five communities

per cent)

increases to police officers.

implementation of this arbitration statute,

policemen have obtained a monetary
With the exception of

have

(41

increased

1970,

(see Table 5.9).

increase.

average wage rates
The probability exists

^Handbook of. Labor Statistics 1970, Washington,
D.C.:
(U.S. Department of Labor--Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1970), p. 167.
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TABLE 5.9
PERCENTAGE SALARY INCREASES COMPARED WITH COST OF LIVING
PERCENTAGES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1966-1970

Percentage Cost of
Year
Living
1ncrease
1 96b

3.7

3.6

1967

6'. 8

4.4

1968

7.4

5.5

1969

10.7

5.1

1970

8.8

5.6

that the reason for a decline

in the average wage

increase was due to the general

economic conditions

in

the country.
There

is no indication that this steady rise

real wage rates

(disregarding the cost of

has been affected by the binding,
statute.

in each community,

economy as a whole,

index)

compulsory arbitration

Other factors such as comparable wage

the tax structure

be

living

in

rates,

the general

and public reactions would have to

included as additional

reasons for this upward trend

in real wages.

G rievance Rates^
Ope rat i ona 1

Mypothes i s X_:

The grievance rate

(in

per cent) has been greater subsequent to the enact¬
ment of the compulsory arbitration law than prior
jto the law.

From the years

1965 to 1970,

five of the twelve

communities reported that they had no grievances.
these five,

three were cities,

and their populations

ranged from the smallest to the largest.
that
size.

Of

The two towns

reported not having any grievances were of medium
No community reported having a grievance

^See Table 5.10.

in the
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TABLE 5.10
NUMBER OF GR IEVANCES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE
STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1965-1970

Year

Number

1965

0

1966

4

1967 '

»

1

1968

6

1969

6

1970

16

116
year 1965.
• In the years

1966 and

1967 a total

of five

grievances dealing with police contracts were reported
in the communities studied.
each,
1968.

Two communities had two

and only one community reported a total
The same number

(six) was

reported

of six

in 1969,

in

and

in 1970 sixteen grievances were reported by four
communities.
This evidence
been

increasing,

indicates that grievance rates have

especially since 1968.

sonable to attribute this
arbitration.
arbitration,
department,

In

is unrea¬

rise solely to compulsory

In addition to the advent of compulsory
more policemen have been added to each
and

it

is evident that the labor organiza¬

tions are becoming more sophisticated

in the overall

grievance procedure.

Tu move r Rates ^ ^
A trend observed concerning turnover rates

is

that more policemen are being added to the force than
are being separated.

The years

the following accession rates:
3.6%,

and 4.2%;

1965 through
A.6%,

4.1%,

the separation rates are:

lOSee Table 5.11.

1970 show
3.5%,

2.6%,

5.6%,
3.3%,

TABLE 5J 1
TURNOVER RATES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1965-1970

Turnover Rates

New Hires

Yea r Actua1

Sepa rations

Pe rcentage Act ua1

Pe rcentage

1965

46

4.6

26

2.6

1966

41

4. 1

33

3.3

1967

35

3.5

24

2.4

1968

56

5.6

25

2.5

1969

36

3.6

23

2.3

1970

42

4.2

16

1 .6

2.6%,

2.5%,

3.0%,

and

1.6%.

there has been an overall

In every year studied

increase

the highest being a 3.1% increase
the

lowest being a 0.6% increase

in policemen hired-in

in

1968 over 1967 and
1969 over 1968.

Absentee Rates
Absentee rates due to reported

illness and those

due to accidents suffered on the job are on the
With the exception of

1965,

lost time due to

increase.

illness

has been on the rise and has proceeded from 3.0% in
1966 to a high of 3.9% in

1970.^

The year 1965 had a

3.2% absentee rate per department.
Likewise,

absentee rates due to accidents have

increased steadily from a
of

1.6% in

1970

low of 0.9% in 1965 to a high

(see Table 5.1?).

Effect o_n Labor-Management Re 1 at ions
From the

information obtained

in this study,

it

would appear that the presence of a compulsory arbitra¬
tion law has had an effect on
Thus general
It stated:

labor-management

relations.

hypothesis number three would be accepted.
The presence of a_ compu 1 so ry a rb i t rat i on

^These absentee rates were compiled by using
formula #2 as presented in :
Dale Yoder, H. G. Heneman,
John Turnbull, and C. Harold Stone, Handbook of Rersonne1
Management and Labor Re 1 at ions, (New York:
McGraw-Hi11
Book Company, Inc., 1958), p. 14-37.
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TABLE 5.12
ABSENTEE RATES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1965-1970

Absentee Rates

Due to
Due to
Year 1 11 ness Accidents Total

1965

3.2

0.9

4. 1

1 966

3.0

1 . 1

4. 1

1967

3.0

1 . 1

4; r

1 968

3.2

1.5

h.7

1969

•3.6

1.5

5.1

1970

3.9

1 .6

5’. 5

%
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board has had an effect on the 1 abor-management
re 1 ations

in those commun ? ties that have had an

expe rience with a compu1sory arbitration boa rd.
In analyzing these data,

it appears that this

effect on the relationship has been a direct
a changed power structure.

result of

Since 1968, when the law

was passed police labor organizations have been able to
use compulsory arbitration and have done so to their
advantage.
and the

This makes the Fraternal

International

powerful

Order of Police

Brotherhood of Police Officers

in addition to the

increasing number of police

office rs.
In all

the communities studied,

authority now takes an active part
The police
the offer

in negotiations.

labor organization now has some recourse
is not considered by them to be

interests of
is well

the corporate

its membership.

aware of this and thus

if

in the best

The corporate authority
is more .concerned with

negotiations.
A few of the mayors or town officials are the
chief negotiators for their community.

This has

advantages because the union negotiators feel
are negotiating with the highest official
community.

In addition,

its

that they

in the

since the elected official
%

is
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the representative of the' general

public i n that

community he should be on the negotiating committee.
One disadvantage of having an elected official
negotiator for the corporate authority

as the

is that he may

not be qualified as a negotiator.
In a majority of the cities and towns,
attorney representing the union
Policemen feel

that this

having a professional
authority,

is

the

is the chief negotiator.

in their best

interest.

By

negotiator opposing the corporate

bargaining statures are equalized.

It also appears after analyzing the

information

obtained that police departments cooperate with each
other

in bargaining with the corporate authority.

many police

locals

other as well
However,

as with locals

there

authorities

in Rhode

The

Island cooperate with each
in different sectors.

is no evidence that the corporate

in the state use this cooperation

in bar¬

gaining to the same degree as the union does.

If the

corporate authorities desire to offset the power base
that the union
work together

is building,

they are going to have to

in a coalition type atmosphere.

Other Responses
In addition to the responses obtained from the
union officials and the corporate authorities

reported

above,

personnel

directors and arbitrators stated their

positions on several

additional

questions which follow:
i

o) the effect of compulsory arbitration on collective
bargaining;

(2) whether or not compulsory arbitration

discouraged collective bargaining;
compulsory arbitration

(3) whether or not

insured municipal

peace;

and

(4) whether or not compulsory arbitration enhanced
unions power and growth.
Four of the five personnel

directors stated that

compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collective
bargaining and that this effect has been an adverse one.
As the personnel

directors observe their operations,

it appears to them that this compulsory arbitration
statute permits manipulation-.
to have an out
situation.

if they want to ’take advantage of the

The corporate authority uses arbitration to

give the policemen a raise
would not approve.
as a scapegoat
addition,

It enables the parties

in wages that the public

The union official

if all

uses arbitration

the demands are not met.

In

four of five reported that they felt compul¬

sory arbitration did enhance union power and growth but
that

it did not

personnel

insure municipal

peace.

The fifth

director held the opposite view to that of

his colleagues.

With regard to the same questions,
corporate authority arbitrators

seven of nine

(78 per cent) stated

that compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collec¬
tive bargaining,

four of six union arbitrators

cent) also held this position,
arbitrators

(61

per

and all eight neutral

(100 per cent) held similar views.

Of the corporate authority arbiters,
that they did not feel

six stated

that compulsory arbitration

discouraged collective bargaining.

All

gave the

im¬

pression that they felt that arbitration was a tool
be used

if and when negotiations

reached an

to

impasse.

Eight of the nine arbitrators felt that compulsory
arbitration enhanced union power and growth.
power and growth are enhanced

in the sense that

ables the union to obtain a decision both
and contract negotiation.

Both
it en¬

in grievance

One arbitrator stated that

compulsory arbitration retards union power and growth,
and only the strike weapon could enhance

it.

Six of the

nine stated that compulsory arbitration did not
municipal

insure

peace basically because of the "whipsaw

effect".^ Three of the six corporate authority

12For example,

if the policemen used arbitration
to obtain a contract and were satisfied, another depart¬
ment in another town or a different group in the same
town would try to obtain a similar package.
Then the
police would want even more, so it would have to go
back to arbitration the,next year.
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arbitrators stated that each side was aware of the
finality of a binding agreement and each would accept
the award as

rendered.

The union arbitrators also felt that compulsory
arbitration has an effect on collective bargaining.
three of the six responses

In

it was stated that compulsory

arbitration discourages collective bargaining because
both sides have the feeling that they must go to
arbitration; whereas,
upon

many of the

if both sides were

good faith.

issues could be agreed

reasonable and would bargain

in

On the question of whether or not compul¬

sory arbitration discouraged collective bargaining,
other three union arbitrators

leaned

direction but had no comments.

the

in the negative

Three out of six union

arbitrators stated that compulsory arbitration enhanced
union power and growth.

The reasons given for this

enhancement were that the policemen now have a weapon
to fight for

increased demands as well

increase membership and power.

as a tool

to

Three other arbitrators

stated that there was no connection between arbitration
and a union's power and growth.

One-half of the

arbitrators did not think that municipal
necessarily prevail

peace would

following an award although all

arbitrators surmised that all

parties would work with a

125

binding award.
All eight neutral

arbitrators felt that compul$

sory arbitration affects collective bargaining.

Six of

these eight expressed the opinion that compulsory
arbitration discourages good faith collective bargaining
It was stated that arbitration,
was chosen

or the easy way out,

in order that blame could not be attached to

one of the parties.

During negotiations,

the two sides

do not discuss any proposals or counter-proposals,

but

rather select their attorneys and arbitrators for the
arbitration hearing.
On the question of relating arbitration and the
enhancement of unions'

power and growth,

four neutral

arbitrators stated that this was the case and the other
four responded by stating that such a possibility
existed.

Growth of the union organization

related to the gains

is directly

it makes for this same organization

In this respect of gains made,

unions have grown and,

with this growth comes power.
The neutral

arbitrators were split as to whether

or not compulsory arbitration would
peace.

On the "pro" side,

insure municipal

since awards may be

existence for no more than one year and
organization does not approve of

in

if the police

its award,

it has

126

another opportunity for a change
reasonably short period of time.

in contract

in a

On the "con" side,

four members stated that nothing can or will

insure

peace.

Opinions Regarding Compulsory Arbitration
in Rhode Island
In order to ascertain the opinions persons had
regarding binding,
Island,

each

compulsory arbitration

individual

interviewed

in Rhode

in this study was

asked the following questions:
(1) Were you satisfied with the decisions made by
the compulsory arbitration board?
(2) Do you think the other parties involved with
compulsory arbitration were satisfied with
the decisions made by the board?
(3) To what extent is compulsory arbitration used
to take the pressure off one or another party?
(4) Should there be any changes
arbitration boards?

in compulsory

(5) Should there be any changes
followed by the board?*3

in the procedures

Part1cipants 1

Opinions of Cornpu1sory Arbit ration

The members of the corporate authority

in five

(42 per cent) of the localities covered by this study
indicated that they were satisfied with the final
decision made by the board concerning their police
department's contract
13See Appendix B.

(see Table 5.13).

The general
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TABLE 5.13
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATE
AUTHORITY AS COMPARED WITH THEIR
PERCEPTION OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971
-- — -Pa rticipants

Actual

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Feelinqs

Corporate Authority

5

7

0

Union Official

4

6

2

Personnel

0

3

2

Corporate Authority

3

7

2

Arbit rators

8

1

3

Perceived Feelings

Director

1 28
comment by these five administrators was that the
arbitration board's award was a fair and equitable one.
The seven members

(58 per cent) that were dissat¬

isfied with 'the arbitration award complained bitterly
about a third.party entering their communities and
establishing wage rates and
rates for the general

indirectly establishing tax

public.

in rendering these decisions,
weigh the financial
adequately.

It was also stated that
the arbitrators did not

positions of the communities

These administrators definitely felt that

the culprit behind these "outrageous" settlements was
the statute that permitted binding arbitration.

Since

the law states that the arbitrators have to take

into

account prevailing wage rates

in the community

wages paid to the trades and to employees
this

in

(i.e.

industry),

is the basis on which the arbitrators make deci¬

sions.

Admittedly this practice takes place,

appeared to the researcher that
slight degree.

The two major bases that arbitrators

in the public sector,

police departments
second,

it

it did- so only to a

used to arrive at a decision were:
wage rates

but

first,

comparable

specifically using

in other surrounding localities;

the community's actual

and

ability to pay.

When each of the corporate authorities was asked

1 29
how he thought the other members of the corporate
authority felt about decisions made
localities,

in their respective

three reported they thought satisfaction

prevailed generally,

seven reported the corporate

authority was .dissatisfied overall,

and two members

reported that they had no opinion.

The prevailing

reasoning for the dissatisfaction was that of having a
third party enter a community and set the tax rates
indirectly through the awards.
Sixty-six per cent of the administrators
that they surmised the arbitrators,

as

reported

individuals,

were satisfied with the decisions they rendered.

One

member of the corporate authority stated that he did
not think the arbitrators were satisfied with the
decision,

but

refused to comment on that statement.

Three other administrators were noncommittal
question.
the parties
award

It appears that satisfaction

on the

is measured by

involved by whether or not- the decision and

is unanimously approved by all

did enter the minds of several

the arbiters.

It

of the corporate author¬

ities that possibly the arbitrator chosen by them was
incompetent at arbitration and did not

know all

ramifications of what he was signing.

Some corporate

authorities just assumed

the

if the arbitrator signed the
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award and did not file a dissent he was satisfied.
In those communities with personnel
three administrators stated the personnel

departments,
directors

were dissatisfied with the award for the same reasons,
and two had no comment.
Surprisingly,

only four administrators

(33 per

cent) thought that the union was satisfied with the
award when

in actuality eight union officials

they were satisfied
tors that

(see Table 5.1^).

reported

The administra¬

reported the union was not satisfied did with

the explanation that unions are never satisfied..
member reported that the union

One

in his community was not

satisfied because the arbitration award was

lower

terms of dollars than the locality had offered

in

in

negotiations.
The union officials

reported to be satisfied with

the decisions also said that they felt other union
officials and the rank and file membership were satis¬
fied on the whole with the decisions handed down
respective communities.
this

in the

A possible explanation for

is that union officials might not have been

totally satisfied with the arbitrators'
they were extremely satisfied with the

decision,

but

idea of compul¬

sory arbitration and the possibilities for the future
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TABLE 5.14
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
•COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION OFFICIALS AS
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rticipants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1 inqs

Union Officia 1

8

4

0

»

Perceived Feelinqs
Corporate Authority

3

9

0

Personnel

0

5

0

Union Official

4

4

4

Arbit rators

f;

c

2

Director
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because of the new statute.
'Union officials agreed three to one that the
corporate authority was not satisfied with the decision
made by the board.
feeling lies

An obvious explanation for this

in the fact that thirty-eight of the

administrators

in the cities and towns

expressed disapproval
General

Assembly,

in Rhode

in the statute when

it was

and only one mayor approved of

The corporate authority had made

All

in the
it.

it apparent to the

union that a third party setting the tax rates
incompatible with

Island

is

its notion of how to run a government.

five union officials

there was a personnel

in

department

their belief that the personnel

localities where
reported that

it was

director was not

satisfied with the award for the same reasons as those
given for the corporate authority,

that

is,

having a

third party enter a community and setting the tax rates
indirectly through the award.
Five union officials

(42 per cent)

reported that

they thought the arbitrators were satisfied with the
decisions,

five reported non-satisfaction,

no comments.
question

and two had

Apparently the union approached this

in the same way as did the corporate authority.

If an arbitrator dissented,

this was assumed to be clear
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evidence of dissatisfaction.
later,

As will

be discussed

this assumption may be misleading.
All

but one of the personnel

directors

reported

that, they were satisfied with the decisions made by the
compulsory arbitration board
Table 5.15).

in their community

These four personnel

that the arbitration award did not,
judgment,

change the financial

directors stated
in their best

position of the community.

It allowed the administrator of the
the list of priorities

(see

locality to maintain

in every case.

The one personnel

director who reported his dissatisfaction with the
decision made claimed that a third party making
decisions

in a community will

The personnel

affect the tax rate.

directors were unanimous

in stating

that the arbitrators as

individuals were satisfied with

the decisions they made.

The statements made by these

personnel

directors were also unanimous since each

reported that his colleagues were dissatisfied with
compulsory arbitration
Each personnel

in their respective community.

director reported that he felt the

corporate authorities were satisfied with the decisions
in their communities.

The reason for this was that the

arbitration award did not cost the community as much as
the administration had anticipated.

TABLE 5.15
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS AS
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rtic1 pants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1 inqs

Personnel

Director

4

Perceived Feelinqs

1

0

•

Corporate Authority

5

0

0

Union Officia 1s

2

2

1

Personnel

0

5

0

4

0

1

Directors

Arbit rators
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It was also felt by two of the personnel
that the union was satisfied,
dissatisfied,

satisfied,

by two that the union was

and one had no comment.

where the personnel
it was

in the award than

In the cases

directors felt the union was

reported that the union received more
it believed possible.

reported by the personnel

directors,

the union was dissatisfied because

In two cases

it was believed

in one case the

union president was voted out of office and,
second case,

directors

in the

the labor organization refused to pay

its

portion of the arbitration cost.
Of the twenty-four arbitrators
this study,

sixteen

(66 per cent)

interviewed

in

reported that they

were completely satisfied with their decisions and
awards handed down

in their respective communities

Tables 5.16,

and 5.18).

5.17,

Seven of these arbiters

were hired by the corporate authority,
arbiters,
arbiters

(see

and eight were neutral

two were union

arbiters.

Only two

representing the administration and two

representing the union stated that they were dissatis¬
fied with the arbitration award
The remaining two arbitrators,

in which they took part.
both from the union,

had

no comments- to offer on this question.
Even though all

three arbitrators are theoretica11y
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TABLE 5.16
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITY
ARBITRATORS AS COMPARED WITH THEIR
PERCEPTION OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rticipants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1 inqs

Corporate Authority
A rbite r

7

2

0

Corporate Authority

6

2

1

Union Officia 1

7

0

2

Personnel

5

0

0

7

2

0

Perceived Feelinqs

Director

Other Arbitrators

—
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TABLE '5. 17
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
•COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION ARBITRATORS AS
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rticipants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1inqs

Union Arbiter

2

2

2

>

Perceived Feelinqs
Corporate Authority

1

2

3

Union OfficI a 1

2

1

3

Personnel

1

1

3

2

1

3

Director

Other Arbit rators
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TABLE 5.18
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS AS
COMPARED V/ITH THEIR PERCEPTION
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Participants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1inqs

Neutral Arbiter

8

0

0

Corporate Authority

5

3

0

Union Official

h

3

1

Personnel

5

0

0

7

1

0

Perceived Feelinqs

Director

Other Arbitrators
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impartial,

the majority of these persons

reportedly are

to some extent favorable to the side that appoints them.
The only truly

impartial

arbitrator

selected by the other two.

is the third person

It appears that those

arbitrators who reported being satisfied with the
decisions made

in their case were able to confine the

award within the boundaries that were set for them by
their respective sides.

In comparing the figures

previously reported concerning the corporate authorities
satisfaction and those figures
atives

(i.e.

authorities,

relating to the represent¬

their arbitrators) of the.corporatea discrepancy

is found.

Seven administra¬

tors and arbitrators agreed as to the satisfactions or
dissatisfactions

resulting from the award

respective localities.

However,

in their

five arbitrators

reportedly felt that the corporate authority was
satisfied with the decision when

in fact the administra¬

tor stated he was not satisfied.
Five arbitrators' reported that they were satisfied
with the award and
made by the union.

in agreement with the statements
Two arbitrators were dissatisfied

as were the corresponding union officials
communities.
ships

later

More will

in those

be stated about these relation¬

in this chapter.
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All

the neutral

arbitrators stated that they were

satisfied with the decisions that their boards handed
«

down.
When the arbitrators were asked about how they
thought their colleagues felt about the decision
rendered,

only three expressed a different feeling than

they themselves felt.

One corporate authority arbitra¬

tor who was dissatisfied with the decisions
his community reportedly thought that

rendered

it was the general

rule for arbitrators to be satisfied.

Another arbitrator

for the administration expressed the opposite view.
felt that although he was satisfied,

in

He

generally the

arbitrator for the corporate authority

is dissatisfied.

His reasoning for this was that arbitration boards are
"pro"

labor.

question.

He would make no’further comments on this

One union arbitrator that was

reportedly

dissatisfied stated that most union arbitrators were
satisfied with decisions made

in their communities.

just happened to have taken part
award which was

lower than the

arbitration took place
and 7 for cross

in an arbitration

locality offered before

(see Appendix D,

reference).

He

Tables 4,

5,

6,
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Use of Arbitration to Reduce Responsibi1ity for Decis ?ons
It was reported earlier that there was a discrep¬
ancy between the dissatisfactions which were expressed
by the corporate authority and the satisfactions
expressed by their appointed arbitrators over the
decisions and awards
of

in their communities.

information supports the

This kind

idea that both sides

(corporate authority and union) use compulsory arbitra¬
tion as a means for shifting blame.

Since both

officials are elected to their positions,

the views

made available as public information are what the
constituents desire to hear.
public record,

It

for

low as possible even though they may

know the police are underpaid.

may well

likely that,

town administrators desire to keep the

policemen's pay as

is convened to

is

If an arbitration board

issue a decision,

be reached.

If the tax rates have to be

adjusted to pay for an
is the party to blame.
deliver the promised
again the culprit

a more just settlement

increase,

the arbitration board

If the union president does not

increases to the rank and file,

is the arbitration board.

To try to substantiate this

idea of the two

parties placing the blame on arbitration,

the corporate

authority arid the union president were asked to state
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their positions on the use of compulsory arbitration as
a means of taking away the responsibility for decision¬
making.

In the case of the personnel

a rb i.t rators, each was asked his

directors and the

impression of the

extent to which compulsory arbitration was used as a
means for shifting blame.
Ten of the twelve corporate authority officials
reported that this was the case.
are so great,

Since public pressures

compulsory arbitration allows the corporate

authority to make a decision which would normally be
unpopular with the general

public.

Only one administra¬

tor stated that he did not employ this technique,

and

one had no comment.
Nine union officials

(74 per cent)

reported that

they used this technique to enhance their position and
four stated that although the corporate authority used
this as a method,
Personnel

the unions did not.

directors were

in total

agreement that

both sides used compulsory arbitration extensively to
take away the responsibility for decision-making.
Since the arbitrators selected by each side are
the representatives of these respective groups
actual

arbitration hearings,

in the

it would seem that these

arbiters would work closely with their employers.

This

means that the corporate authority arbiter has to know
before the tripartite panel
administration

convenes how high the

is willing to go and the union arbiter

has to know the minimum package acceptable to the rank
and file.

It appears that these persons would know

whether or not each side uses compulsory arbitration as
a means for shifting blame.

If an administrator

publicly denounces an award,

yet the package

the guidelines given to the arbiter,
administrator

it

is

is within

likely the

is using compulsory arbitration to his

own advantage.

The same

Seven arbitrators

is true for the union side.
(78 per cent) for the corporate

authorities stated this practice was used extensively,
one reported
reported

it was used to a slight degree,

it was not used.

and one

The arbiter who reported

that this technique was not used was employed by the
community whose corporate authority stated the same
position.

Thus,

arbitrators'

there

is perfect agreement between the

answers and those given by the corporate

authority.
This agreement between arbitrator and client does
not exist for the union.

The union officials

in two

communities reported that they did not use this kind of
technique, while the arbitrator had a contrary opinion.

All

but one neutral

arbitrator reported that both

sides used compulsory arbitration as a means for shift¬
ing blame,

but all declined to relate any specifics.

From the data

it appears that compulsory arbitra¬

tion is used to enhance relative positions on the part
of both unions and corporate authorities.

Changes

? n Arbit rat ?on Boards

The consensus of opinion among the members of the
corporate authority

is that there should be changes

the makeup of compulsory arbitration boards.

in

Instead

of having three persons entering a community and making
awards which eventually determine the tax rates,

it

should be assured that these persons be residents of
•Rhode

Island

if not members of the community.

What the administrators are proposing .is a labor
court’ that would hear all

cases

in Rhode

Island.

This

labor court would be composed of five residents of the
state who would be appointed by the governor.
admi ri i s t ra tors feel
dure,

The

that by having this type of proce¬

this court would be better able to comprehend the

comparative packages

in other communities as well

as

packages within a community.
One possible problem of this type of structure is
political

in nature.

It might be a relatively simple
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matter to stack the board

in favor of one side or the

other depending on the governor's desires.
Ten of twelve union officials are satisfied with
the jnakeup of the board and the personnel
approve

in a

directors

like proportion.

The arbitrators overwhelmingly disapprove of any
changes
reaction
it

in the system now used

in this state.

Their

is one of fairness because they believe that

is fair and equitable for each side to be able to

choose the representative that they think will
their position the most.

enhance

These two representatives

choose a third party whom they know to be

impartial

thereby enhancing the objectivity of the board.

Changes _i_n Procedu re Iby the Boa rd
Eighty per cent of the administrators,
officials,

arid the personnel

the union

directors are satisfied

with the procedures followed by the board.

It appears

to them that the tripartite board analyzes the

informa¬

tion given to them in the hearings and acts accordingly.
The other twenty per cent who reportedly would change
the board's procedure would take away the opportunity
for compromise among

issues.

Instead of the arbiters

making compromises between the number of days off arid
wages for example,

each side would prepare a package
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and the arbitration board would select one of the two
packages

in their entirety.

The corporate authority arbitrators by a vote of
67 per cent to 33 per cent elect to have no changes

in

procedure.

in

The union's arbitrators are 50 per cent

favor of a change
of the neutral
It

in procedures; whereas,

arbitrators are

75 per cent

in favor of a change.

is apparent from these figures that the neutral

arbitrators are more prone to experiment with a
package offer.

last

Since this kind of approach has never

been

instituted anywhere

in the world prior to this

date

it might prove to be a worthwhile experience.

Summary
It was possible to

interview all

the twelve communities that had been
binding,

compulsory arbitration.

those parties

involved

in

Those persons

inter¬

viewed were:
(1) The top ranking officer of the policemen's
association;
(2) The top ranking official

of the corporate

authority;
(3) The personnel
(4)

director;

Each of the three arbitrators
the decisions.

in

involved with
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On the basis of the
interviews,

information obtained

in the

conclusions were drawn on the operational
«

hypotheses and on the general
the practical
Rhode

hypotheses.

In addition,

significance of the general

hypotheses to

Island was discussed.
Opinions were obtained from all

persons

viewed regarding compulsory arbitration
The opinions discussed

in this chapter

inter¬

in Rhode

Island.

included those on

the use of arbitration to reduce responsibility for
decision-making,
boards,

changes

and changes

in the compulsory arbitration

in the procedures followed by

compulsory arbitration boards.
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CHAPTER

VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Collective bargaining

in the public sector has

been undergoing a vast and far-reaching transition
the

last decade.

members

Every year the number of union

in this sector of the economy

With this

increase

comes substantial

are prohibited

in work relationships and

including the possible

in nearly every state,

increase

in

such stoppages

increasing frequency

the State of Rhode

process which was

in recent years

Island

instituted a

intended to give public erpployees an

alternative to work stoppages.
binding,

increasing.

Although strikes by public employees

have occurred with
In 1968,

is

in the number of union personnel
change

working conditions
work stoppages.

in

This 'a 1ternative

compulsory arbitration.

Since Rhode

has made no provision for compiling any
the experience under the act,

is

Island

information on

it would seem that a

detailed analysis of one area of coverage would aid all
parties concerned.

The sector covered

in this

report

the police departments which have utilized binding,
compulsory arbitration
disputes.

in order to settle contract

i
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Methodo1ogy
Primary sources of data
(1) the General

in this study

Laws of the State of Rhode

(2) .interviews with the following:
policeman's association,
authority,

officers of

individuals who have been neutral

and personnel

The methodological
First,

arbitration board;

arbitrators,

directors for the cities and/or
legislation.

procedure consisted of two

implementation of the compulsory

and second,

using a structured

members of the policeman's association,

members of the corporate authority,
personnel

the

a detailed analysis of the state -lav;

which provides for the

questionnaire,

and

arbitrators for the corporate

towns which have been affected by this

parts:

Island;

members of the corporate

arbitrators for the union,
authority,

included:

directors were

interviewed

arbitrators,

and

in those cities

and/or towns that have had experience with a compulsory
a rbit ration boa rd.
Three general

hypotheses were used to test the

f o1 lowing:
(1) The relationship of the geographic location
to the utilization of a compulsory arbitration boa rd;
(2) The relationship of the size of the bargaining
unit to the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board; and
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(3) The effect of the compulsory arbitration boards
on the labor-management relationship.
Operational
general

hypotheses were used to test the

hypotheses.

Results
According to the data collected

in this study

it

is possible to state that:
(1) There is a significant relationship between
the population in a geographic location and
the utilization of a compulsory arbitration
board; (i.e. the larger the population the
more likely compulsory arbitration will be
utilized to settle an impasse in that
community).
(2 ) The re is a significant relationship between
the form of government in a geographic
location and the utilization of a compulsory
arbitration board; (i.e. cities are more
likely to utilize compulsory arbitration than
a re towns).
(3) There is a significant relationship between
the number of full-time policemen in a
geographic location and the utilization of a
compulsory arbitration board; (i.e. the
greater the number of policemen in a
community, the more likely compulsory
arbitration will be utilized to settle an
impasse in that community).
(4) There is a significant relationship between
the number of members in a bargaining unit
and the utilization of a compulsory arbitra¬
tion board; (i.e. the larger the bargaining
unit the more likely compulsory arbitration
will be utilized to settle an impasse in that
community).
(5) - Policemen feel

that the compulsory arbitration
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board has affected the collective bargaining
process.
The most important effect has been
to make collective bargaining more realistic
since this statute forces the employer to
offer proposals and counterproposals.
(6) The members of the corporate authority feel
that compulsory arbitration has affected the
collective bargaining process in that compul¬
sory arbitration has caused administrators to
pay more attention to collective bargaining.
Since there is a possibility of an unjust
award on the part of the arbitrators, admin¬
istrators feel decision-making under collec¬
tive bargaining is far superior to compulsory
arbitration.
Binding, compulsory arbitration
hinders collective bargaining according to
administrators because they are apprehensive
about making known their last offer.
Even though there are faults to be found with the
statute as

it stands,

the persons who have participated

in this kind of decision-making process appear generally
satisfied with the results produced so far.

Imp1ications
Despite all

the warranted and unwarranted criti¬

cisms about compulsory arbitration,

the fact

that the overwhelming majority of persons
in this
tion

report agree that binding,

remains

interviewed

compulsory arbitra¬

is far superior to settling disputes than the

right to strike would be.

Eleven persons thought that

^See for instance:
Damon Stetson, "Union Official
Scores Arbitration as Costly and Time-Consuming," The
New York Sunday Times, May 30, 1971.
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the right to strike should be granted to policemen as
opposed to fifty-three who favored compulsory arbitra¬
tion.
It seems clear that every worker should have
certain basic requirements met by the employer
of wages,

hours,

and working conditions.

requirements are not met,

in terms

If these

the employees should have

some recourse to force the employer to upgrade any
lacking conditions.

Although the most effective way

which to obtain this goal
strike,

is through the use of the

certain groups of people

(namely fire fighters

and policemen) probably should not have this
The primary reason

in

right.

is that these two groups of employees

help protect the health and safety of the general

public.

»

Unqua1? fied Participants
Since binding,
be here to stay,
economy,

at

compulsory arbitration appears to
least

in the public sector of the

members of the corporate authority and union

officials have to learn that money which
hiring incompetent arbitrators

is

is saved

in

lost when this arbi¬

trator affixes his signature to an award.
attempt to save arbitration costs,

If,

in an

a city or town

chooses a city solicitor with no arbitration experience
as

its representative

in a hearing,

and he enters

into
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arbitration with a highly skilled professional

arbitrator

representing the union and a superbly trained neutral
arbitrator,

the city or town will

be

in a disadvantageous

position.
In the majority of cases where one side or the
other complained vehemently about the award,
researcher's judgment,

in the

an unqualified arbitrator had

been employed.

Inefficiencies of the Arbit ration P rocess
One of the major shortcomings of binding,
sory arbitration as observed
complaint of timing.

compul¬

in this study was the

Whenever wages,

rates of pay,

or

any other matter requiring appropriation of money by
‘any.city or town are
bargaining,

it

included as matter of collective

is the obligation of the bargaining agent

to serve written notice of

request for collective bar¬

gaining on the corporate authority.
be sent at
the

This request must

least one hundred and twenty days prior to

last day on which money can be appropriated to

cover the contract period.
During the time period when negotiations commence
and an arbitration board

is convened,

a variety of

issues are discussed by the two sides.
issues are resolved during negotiations.

Some of these
However, when
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any one

issue

is submitted to arbitration,

revert back to the original

all

issues

position and are submitted

to a rbit ration.
Instead of an arbitration board having five or
six

issues to decide upon,

thirty.
time

they often have twenty or

Obviously the more

issues there are,

it takes to decide them all,

the more

and the higher the

cost of arbitration.
One possible solution to this type of problem
might be the use of an "arsenal

of weapons approach".

If the statute were amended to enable the arbitration
board to choose whether to hear each
and decide on the merits of each,

issue

individually

or to employ the

process of selecting the entire package of one side,
much time and money might be saved.

In either case,

if

both sides are confronted with the possibility of rising
or falling on the last offer they might we 11
the package more objectively.

look at

In being more objective,

both sides should be more reasonable.
entire package were not adopted,

Even

if the

the boundaries of each

issue would be narrowed considerably.^A second shortcoming of the binding arbitration

J.

solution reached
Fallon, Arbitrator.

in a discussion with V/ i 1 1 i am
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statute

is the resultant

limited flexibility allowed

the negotiating parties.

As

reported earler,

request for collective bargaining must be

the

initiated at

least one hundred and twenty days prior to the last day
on which money can be appropriated.
bargaining agent activates

In many cases the

requests more than one

hundred and twenty days prior to this date.

Coupled

with this one hundred and twenty day provision
section of the

is a

law which states that no contract shall

exceed the term of one year and this further
bargaining flexibility allowed parties.

It

limits the
is very

likely that negotiations through collective bargaining
and arbitration may proceed for three out of tlie twelve
months.

This means there

is

little time to settle

disputes except on a crisis basis.

The elimination of

the one year limitation would encourage creative
collective bargaining and should therefore
satisfaction on the part of all

parties

increase

involved.

Future Research
Since this study examined only those communities
that have had experience with binding,

compulsory

arbitration there has been no comparison of the labormanagement

relationships with those communities that

have not utilized this means of settling disputes.

This
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would be essential
might be

to ascertain how all

involved with binding arbitration feel.

When the term "all
mean an

parties that

increase

different

is used,

this would

in the scope of a similar study to

include a sample,
policemen.

parties"

if not all,

of the rank and file

It might also be possible to determine

if

ranks of policemen have different feelings

about compulsory arbitration.
law could be

It

is possible that the

improved significantly by those who are

most affected by

it--the policemen.

Another research project would be one which would
compare adjacent cities and/or towns whose boundary
the state line.

It would be

1abor-management

relationship

is

interesting to compare the
in one city that has

utilized compulsory arbitration and these same relation
ships
ment

in an adjoining city or town whose police depart¬
is unable to take their case to a binding

a rbit ration boa rd.
These research projects would provide
knowledge of the effects of binding,

compulsory arbitra

tion and could be used to establish better
relations

increased

labor

laws under which we as citizens must

live.
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TABLE

1

COMPARISON OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION STATUTES BY STATE,
DECEMBER 31, 1970

Effective
Date

Cove rage

Awa rd
Binding Number of
on Whom Members

WYOMING

May 22,
1965

F i re fighte rs

A1 1
pa rties

Three

PENNSYLVANIA

June 24,
1 968

Firemen
and
Poll cernen

A1 1
parties

Th ree

Sept.,
] 968

A1 1
pub 1ic
emp1oyees

A1 1
pa rties

Th ree

State

RHODE

ISLAND

A1 1
All
•
pa rties
pub 11c
emp1oyees
except
classified

Ml CHI GAN

Oct. 1 ,
1 969

VERMONT

July 1,
1970

F i refighte rs

A1 1
pa rties

Three

HAWA1i

July 1 ,
1970

A1 1
pub 1ic
emp1oyees

A1 1
parties

Three

*

Th ree

169

TABLE 1--Continued

Se1ection
of Neutral Dete rmination Payment of
Arbit rator of an Impasse Arbit ration

•

State

WYOMING

District
Within a
Judge in
stated period
communit y of time from
start of
negotiations

Appea1
P rocedu res
of Award

Awa rd
dete rmines
cos t
a 11ocation

Yes

Pub 1 ic em¬
ployer pays
all costs
except union
arbit rator

Yes

PENNSYLVANIA

Parties
choose
f rom list
sent by
AAA

RHODE

Chief
Within a
Justice of stated period
Supreme
of time from
Cou rt
start of
negotiations

Pa rties
bea r
equa 1
sha re

Yes

Chairman Within stated
of Employment
period of
Re 1 ations
time after
Commi s.s i on
mediation

Parties
bea r
equa 1
sha re

Yes

Yes

ISLAND

MICHIGAN

Fai1u re of
Legis1 atu re
to approve a
negotiated
agreement

VERMONT

Commis sione
of Labor
and
Industry

Within statec
period of
time after
mediation

Parties
bea r
equal
sha re

HAWA 1 1

Pub 1 ic
Emp1oyment
Re 1 ations
Boa rd

Within statec
pe riod of
time after
mediation

Parties
bea r
equa 1
sha re

Not
discus sed
in statute
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A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AMD PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971.

Questionna\re For Union Officials

Part

I

Name of

Face Sheet Data

Interviewee:

Title of
Data of

_

Interviewee:
Interview:

Location of

Interest:

Name of Union:
Comments:

_

172

Part

1.

II

Interview Data

Are any law enforcement officers on your police
force members of a union organization?
(Mote:
Union organization would include the FOP.)
Yes

No

If your answer
questions:

is Yes,

please answer■ the following

a)

To which union do they belong?

b)

How many are dues paying members of the union
organization?
0-

24

175-199

350-374

25- 49

200-224

375-399

50- 74

. 225-249

400-424

75- 99

250-274

425-449

100-124

275-299

450-474

125-149

300-324

475-499

150-174

325-349

500 and ove r

c)

How many a re non-members of the ba rgainii ng uni
0- 24

175-199

350-374

25- 49

200-224

375-399

50- 74

225-249

400-424

75- 99

250-274

425-449

*

•

100-124

275-299

450-474

125-149

300-324

475-499

150-174

325-349

500 and ove r_
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2. Ware /ou satisfied with the decisions made by the
arbitration board?
Yes_No_
Why or why not?

3. Do you believe the other union officials and members
were satisfied with the decisions made by the
a rbit ration boa rd ?
Yes_

No_

—

Why or why not?

4. Do you believe the personnel directors were satisfied
with the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No_

Why or why not?

5. Do you believe the corporate authority was satisifed
with the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes

No.

Why or why not?

1 74
6.

Do you believe the arbitrators were satisfied with
trie decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes_No_
Why or why not?

7.

Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has
has any effect on collective bargaining?
Yes_No _
a)

b)

I f • Y e s:
1)

In what ways has collective bargaining
been affected?

2)

Why has collective bargaining been
affected?

If No:
1)

Why has collective bargaining not been
affected?
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8.

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration
municipal (governmental) peace?
Yes _
a)

b)

No_

if Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
insured peace?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration
peace?

insure

If No:
1)

3.

insures

Why does compulsory arbitration not
insure peace?

Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances
union power and growth?
Yes _
a)

No _

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
enhanced union power and growth?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration enhance
union power and growth?
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b)

If Mo:
Why does compulsory arbit ration not
enhance union power and growth?

1)

Do you be 1 ieve that compu1 sor/ arbitration d i s cou rages col 1ective ba rgaining?
Yes
a)

Mo
If Yes

i)

#
•

In v/hat ways has compulsory arb it ration
aiscou ra ged collect ive bargaini ng?
•

2)

b)

If No:

n

11.

Why does compu1sory arbit ration d i s cou rage co11ective ba rgaining?

Why does compu1sory a rbit ration not
discourage collective bargaining?

Do you feel anything should be changed regarding
compulsory arbitration boards?
(For example:
the
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are
chosen, etc.)
Yes .

No

177
a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If ho:
1)

12.

Why?

Do you fee' anything should be changed regarding
procedures followed by compulsory arb'tration
boards?
(For example:
neutral arbitrator accept¬
ing an entire package /s. splitting the difference.)
Yes _
a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

What snould be done? -

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

Why?
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13.

14.

15.

How do arbitrators

reach their decisions?

To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat
‘off one or another party?

Is there anything I should have asked
interview but did not?
Yes _

No _

Please exp 1 ain.

in this
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A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971.
Questionnaire For Corporate Authority

Part

I

Name of

Face Sheet Data

Interviewee:

Title of
Date of

__

Interviewee:
Interview: _

Location of
Comments:

Interest:
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Part

1.

II

Interview Data

Were you satisfied with the decisions made by the
arbit ration boa rd?
Yes __

No _____

Why or wh.y not?

2.

Do you believe the other members of the corporate
authority were satisfied with the decisions made
by the arbitration board?
Yes __

No _

Why or why not?

3.

Do you believe the personnel directors were satisfied
with the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No_

Why or why not?

4. Do you believe the arbitrators were satisfied with
the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes

No

Why or why not?
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5. Do you believe the un'ion was. satisfied with the
decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

Why or why not?

6. Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has
had any effect on collective bargaining?
Yes
a)

b)

No
If Yes:
i)

In what ways has collective bargaining
been affected?
.

2)

Why has collective bargaining been
affected ?

If No:
i)

Why has collecti ve bargaining not been
affected?

7. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration
municipal (governmental) peace?
‘Yes

No

insures
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a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
insured peace?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration
peace?

If No:
1)

8.

insure

Why does compulsory arbitration not
insure peace?

Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances
union power and growth?
'Yes_
a)

No_

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
enhanced union power and growth?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration enhance
union power and growth?

183

b)

If No:
1)

9.

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬
courages collective bargaining?
Yes _
a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
discouraged collective bargaining?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration dis¬
courage collective bargaining?

If Nck
1)

10.

Why does compulsory arbitration not
enhance union power and growth?

Why does compulsory arbitration not
discourage collective bargaining?

Do you feel anything should.be changed regarding
compulsory arbitration boards?
(For example:
the
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are
chosen, etc.)
Yes

No

*
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a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

11.

Why?

Do you feel anything should be changed regarding
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration
boards?
(For example:
neutral arbitrator accept¬
ing an entire package vs. splitting the difference.)
Yes _
a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

Why?
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12. How do arbitrators reach their decisions?

13, To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat
off one or another party?

14. Is there anything I should have asked
interview but did not?
Yes

No

Please explain.

in this
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A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971 .

Questionnaire For Public Personnel

Part

I

Name of

Face Sheet Data

Interviewee:

Title of
Date of

_

Interviewee:
Interview:

Location of

_

Interest:

Comments:

%

Directors

187

Part

1.

II

Interview Data

Which of the following best describes the geographic
location within which your police department
operates?
City

Other
•

T own

What

(please specify

is your populat i on?
0- 9,999

100,000- 109,999

10,000- 19,999

110,000- 119,999

20,000- 29,999

120,000- 129,999

30,000- 39,999

130,000- 139,999

40,000- 49,999

140,000- 149,999

50,000- 59,999

150,000- 159,999
r\

60,000- 69,999

V

160,000- 169,999

70,000- 79,999

170,000- 179,999

80,000- 89,999

180,000- 189,999

90,000- 99,999

190,000 and over

What

ranks are el igi b 1 e for uni on membership
Yes

Chief
Deputy Ch i ef
Ma j o r
Capta i n
Lieutenant

No

188
No

Yes
Se rgeant
Pat ro1 man
Me t e r Maids

4.

Which of the following ranges best describes the
total number of law enforcement officers in your
police department?
24

175-199

350-374

25- 49

200-224

375-399

50- 74

225-249

400-424

75- 99

250-274

425-449

100-124

275-299

' 450-474 '

125-149

300-324

475-499

150-174

325-349

500 and over

0-

■

Has a compulsory a rbit rat ion board ever been estab1ished to solve any issue for the police department
in this comnnun i ty?
Yes _
a)

No_

If Yes :
1)

What

issue(s) were decided?

2)

Please explain the nature of the
and the out come(s).

issue(s)
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3) Were you satisfied with the decisions
made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

Why or why not?

4) Do you believe other personnel directors
were satisfied with the decisions made
by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

V/hy or why not?

5) Do you believe the corporate authority
was satisfied with the decisions made
by the arbitration board?
Yes

'

No

Why or why not?

6) Do you believe the union was satisfied
with the decisions made by the arbitration boa rd ?
Yes

No

V/hy or why not?
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7)

Do you believe the arbitrators were
satisfied with the decisions made by
the arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

Why or why not?

6.

Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has had
any effect on collective bargaining?
Yes _
a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has collective bargaining
been affected?

2)

Why has collective bargaining been
affected?

If No:
1)

7.

No_

Why has collective bargaining not been
affected?

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration
municipal (governmental) peace?
Yes

No

*

insures
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a)

If Yes:
1)

2)

b)

Why does compulsory arbitration
peace?

insure

If No:
1)

8.

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
insured peace?

Why does compulsory arbitration not
insure peace?

Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances
union power and growth?
Yes _
a)

No _

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
enhanced union power and growth?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration enhance
union power and growth?

192

b)

If No:
1)

9.

V/hy does compulsory arbitration not
enhance union power and ‘growth?

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬
courages collective bargaining?
Yes
a)

No
If Yes:
i)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
discouraged collective bargaining?

2)

V/hy does compulsory arbitration dis¬
courage collective bargaining?

#

b)

If No:

n

V/hy does compulsory arbitration not
discourage collective bargaining?

193

10.

Could you please give mo the number of occurrences
iri each of the following categories for the period
spec If led?
a)

Grievance Rates

1965'_
1966
1 96 7 1...
1968
1969
1970 _
b)

Turnover Rates

Accession Rates

1966

T o l a 1 Acce s s I on s

I lew HI res

_

_

1 966

1967
1968
1969

__

_""

_

_

1970

..

.

Separation Rates
Total Separations

Quits

Layoffs

1966
1966

_

__

1967

._

__

I_

1969

_I

I_

I__

1 968

1970

'

_

__
$

c) Absentee Kate (Due to Illness)
1966
I 966

I 96 /

196K

1969
19/0

«

1 9k
d)

Absentee Rate

(Due to Accidents
the Job)

Incurred on

1965

1966
1967

1968
1969
1970

11.

Could you please give me the amount of wage increase
in the following years?
How much of this was due to
inflation (i.e. cost of living increases)?
1965 _

1966

1967 __

1 988

1969 _
1970

12.

•

Do you feel anything should be changed regarding
compulsory arbitration boards?
(For example:
the
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are chosen,
etc. )
Yes _____
a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

What

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

Why?

should be done?
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13. Do you feel anything • shou1d be changed regarding
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration
boards?
(For example:
neutral arbitrator accepting
an entire package vs. splitting the difference.)
Yes _
•a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

Why?

14. Mow do arbitrators

reach their decisions?

15. To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat
off one or another party?

16. Is there anything
view but did not?
Yes

No

Please explain.

I

should have asked

in this

inter¬

A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971

Questionnaire For Public Arbitrators

Part

I

Face Sheet Data

Name of
Title of
Date of

Interviewee:
Interviewee:
Interview:

Location of

_

_

Interest:

Type of Arbitrator:_
union
Type of Arbitration:

Comments:

corporate

_
grievance

neut ra1

contract

197

Part

1.

II

Interview Data

Did the arbitration board follow a formal
procedure?
Yes __

2.

operating

No _

a)

Please exp 1 ain.

b)

Why did the board follow this procedure?

Have you ever arbitrated a case
decision?
Yes _
a)

involving a wage

No_

If Yes, was the board operated formally?
Yes_No_
Please exp 1 ain.

b)

•

If No, was the board operated formally on the
non-wage issue?
Yes

No

Please exp lain.
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3. Were you satisfied wrth the decisions made by the
arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

V/hy or why not?

4. Do you believe the other arbitrators were satisfied
with the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No _

V/hy or why not?

5. Do you believe the personnel directors were satis¬
fied with the decisions made by the arbitration
board?
Yes _

No _

V/hy or why not?

6. Do you believe the corporate authority was satisfied
with the decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes_No _
V/hy or why not?
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7.

Do you believe the union was satisfied with the
decisions made by the arbitration board?
Yes _

No

V/hy or why not?

3.

Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has had
any effect on collective bargaining?
Yes _
a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has collective bargaining
been affected?

2)

V/hy has collective bargaining been
affected?

If No:
1)

9.

No _

V/hy has collective bargaining not been
affected?

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration
municipal (governmental) peace?
Yes

No

insures
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a)

If Yes:
1)

2)

b)

Why does compulsory arbitration
peace ?

insure

If No:
1)

10.

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
insured peace?

Why does compulsory arbitration not
insure peace?

Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances
union power and growth? •
Yes_No_
a)

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
enhanced union power and growth?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration enhance
union power and growth?
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b)

If No:
1)

11.

Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬
courages collective bargaining?
Yes _
a)

b)

No _

If Yes:
1)

In what ways has compulsory arbitration
discouraged collective bargaining?

2)

Why does compulsory arbitration dis¬
courage collective bargaining?

If No:
1 )

12.

Why does compulsory arbitration not
enhance union power and growth?

Why does compulsory arbitration not
discourage collective bargaining?

Do you feel anything should be changed regarding
compulsory arbitration boards?
(For example:
the
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are
chosen, etc.)
Yes

No
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a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

13.

Why?

Do you feel anything should be changed regarding
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration
boards?
(For example:
neutral arbitrator accept¬
ing an entire package vs. splitting the difference.)
Yes _

No __
*

a)

b)

If Yes:
1)

What should be done?

2)

Why?

If No:
1)

Why?
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14. How do arbitrators reach their decisions?

15. To what -extent is arbitration used to take the heat
off one or another party?

16. Is there anything ! should have asked
interview but did not?
Yes

No

Please explain.

in this
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TABLE

1

LISTING OF QUESTIONS USED TO GATHER DATA FOR THE
GENERAL AND OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES IN AN
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1971

Questions used to Test
Operational Hypothesis
Gene ra1
Ope rationa1
Hypothesis Hypothesis
Number
Numbe r

1

Pe rsonne1

1

2,5

2

1,5

3

4,5

4

5

*

1 1

I

•

1
1

5

1 1 1

Corporate
Un i on Authority Arbiters

1,2

6

1,2

7

5,6,7,
8,9,12

2,3,
4,5,
6,7,
8,9,
10,
1 1 ,
1 2

1, 2,3,4
5,6,7,8,
9,10,11

3,4,5,
6,7,8,
9,10,
11,12

8

5,6,7,
8,9,12

2,3,
4,5,
6,7,
8,9,
10,
11,
1 2

1,2,3,4,
5,6,7,8,
9,10, 11

3,4,5,
6,7,8,
9,10,
11,12

9

1 1

10

10
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APPENDIX

D

TABLE

207

1

POPULATION DATA FOR THE CITIES AND TOWNS
IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, 1971

City or Town

New Shoreham

S i ze

489

City or Town

S i ze

South Kingston

16,913

West Greenwich

1,841

Weste r1y

17,248

Little Compton

2,385

Ba r rington

17,554

Richmond

2,625

Bristol

17,860*

Foster

2,626

Central

Cha r1estown

2,863

Johnston

22,037

Jamestown

2,91 1*

Covent ry

22,947

Exeter

3,245

West Warwick

24,323*

G1oceste r

5,160

North Providence

24,337*

Hopkinton

5,392

Cumbe r1 and

26,605*

Na r ragansett

7,138

North Kingston

27,673

Scituate

7,489

Middletown .

29,621

North Smithfield

9,349

Newport** •

34,562

Woonsocket**

46,820*

East Greenwich

• 9,577

Falls**

•

18,716*

Bu r ri11vi11e

10,087

East Providence**

48,151

War ren

10,523

C ranston**

73,037*

Port smouth

12,521

Pawtucket**

76,984*

Tive rton

12,55 9- W a rwic k**

Smithfield

1 3,468

Linco1n

16,182

Providence**

83,694*
179,213*

*lndicates having utilized compulsory arbitration.
**lndicates city form of government.
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TABLE 2
POLICE MEMBERSHIP IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE
CITIES AND TOWNS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971

City
or
Town

Total
Numbe r
Numbe r
of Non- Number of
of
Membe rs Members Po1icemen

West Greenwich

2

Little Compton

•

0

2

3

0

3

Richmond

3

0

3

Foster

5

0

5

Cha r1estown

4

0

4

Jamestown

6

1

7

G1oceste r

7

1

8

Hopkinton

.8

0

8

Na r ragansett

6

3

9

Scituate

6

0

6

North Smithfield

1 2

0

1 2

East Greenwich

10

0

10

Burri1lvi1le

13

0

13

War ren

16

1

17

Portsmouth

1 1

5

16

Tive rton

15

0

15

Smithfie1d

17

0

17

Lincoln

17

0

17

South Kingston

22

0

22

TABLE 2--Continued

City
or
Town

Numbe r
Numbe r
Tota 1
of Non- Number of
of
Members Membe r s Po1icemen
r-.
CM

1

28

29

0

29

24

6

30

35

1

36

Johnston

36

0

36

Covent ry

28

9

37

West Warwick

38

0

38

North Providence

30

1

31

Cumbe r1 and

3°

0

30

North Kingston

32

0

32

Mi dd 1 etov/n

35

1

36

Newport

41

2

43

Woonsocket

101

0

101

East Providence

103

3

106

62

43

105

Pawtucket

150

3

153

Warwick

1 32

18

150

P rovidence

394

20

414

Weste r1y
Ba rrington
B risto1
Cent ra1

Falls

C rans tori
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TABLE 3
MEMBERSHIP IN A POLICE LABOR ORGANIZATION COMPARED WITH
THE TYPE OF PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN SETTLING DISPUTES
IN EACH COMMUNITY, 1971

Arbit rators

•

Comrnunity

Numbe r
Corpo rate
of
Members Authority Union Neut ra1

24

F

F

1

35

1

F

1

C ranston

62

1

F

1

Curnbe r 1 and

30

F

F

F

6

1

F

1

30

1

F

1

Pawtucket

150

1

F

F

P rovidence

394

1

F

F

15

F

F

F

1 30

1

F

F

35

1

F

1

101

1

1

1

Bristol
Cent ra1

Falls

Jamestown
North Providence

Tive rton
Wa rwick
West Warwick
Woonsocket

•

F-Indicates a formal operating procedure,
l-lndicates an informal operating procedure.

TABLE

A

ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITY AS
COMPARED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
PERCEPTION OF THE CORPORATE AUTHOR¬
ITIES' SATISFACTION, 1971

Participants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Feelings

Corporate Authority

5

7

0

Union Official

3;.

9

0

Personnel

5

0

0

Corporate Authority
Arbiter

6

2

1

Union Arbiter

1

2

3

Neutral

5

0

3

Perceived Feelinqs

Director

Arbiter

21 2

TABLE 5
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION OFFICIALS AS COMPARED
WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF
THE UNION OFFICIALS' SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rticipants

Actua1

Not
No
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1inqs

Union Official

8

4

0

7

2

Perceived Feelinqs
Corporate Authority

3

Personnel

2

2

1

Corporate Authority
Arbiter

7

0

2

Union Arbiter

2

1

3

Neutral

4

3

1

Director

Arbiter

»
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TABLE 6
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS AS
COMPARED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS'
PERCEPTION OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS'
SATISFACTION, 1971

Pa rticipants

Actua1

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Fee 1 inqs
4

1

0

• 0

3

2

Union Official

0

5

0

Corporate Authority
Arbiter

3

0

0

Union Arbiter

1

1

3

Neutral Arbiter

3

0

0

Personnel

Director

Perceived Fee 1inqs
Corporate Authority
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TABLE 7
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND
EXPRESSED BY THE ARBITRATORS AS COMPARED
WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION
OF THE ARBITRATORS' SATISFACTION, 1971

No
Not
Satisfied Satisfied Comment

Participants

Actua1

Fee 1 inqs

Arbit rators

4

17

Perceived Feelings
Corporate Authority
Union Officia 1
Personnel

.

Director

2

•
1

3

5

5

2

5

0

0

' 8

.

